The failure of relations between the Iraqi and Kurdistan Regional governments

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By Dr Niaz Najmadin

Introduction
Understanding Haji Karim, a Kurdish national born in 1960, answer to one of my questions may be a good way to open discussion on this subject:
"On a hot summer's day in 1986, a group of our relatives and friends came to visit us in our village, which was approximately a three-hour walk from theirs. They came to help us harvest the tobacco crops that we had grown in our fields. Our relatives stayed with us for almost a week and by the end were pretty tired. Over the seven days, we were unable to provide a single full meal for them. However, we still enjoyed our time working in the fields together immensely. In the evenings, we rested by playing folk games. We were eager to display our affection and kindness towards one another, as business and money were not motivations. Our relatives took no payment for the work they did for us. This practice was the same in all nearby villages as the currency between us was trust. However, two to three years later, all of the nearby villages were flattened by war and had little choice but to migrate to the cities. Unfortunately, I feel these that trust, respect and collective action that was so important in the villages have since faded away. In many respects, I was happier in those days that I was today in 2018."

It is worth me directing your attention to the fact that thrift was not the cause of Haji Karim's period of poverty but a consequence of the poor economic conditions of the time. More importantly, at the end of the week, when Haji Karim returned to the ranks of the Peshmerga revolutionaries, food and resources were scarce outside of the urban centres. Smoke from oil fields had darkened the skies over the cities, and its promise had begun to attract the attention of the political elites and bureaucrats promising a better future for the nation. This quick historical summary makes one of the objectives of this discussion clear: the culture of defrauding and fleecing took over from the culture of cooperation in Iraq and Iraqi Kurdistan, in particular after the 1960s. 

A short excerpt of Haji Karim's biography makes clear the other objectives of this discussion. Although he was unable to receive a school qualification, he gained employment as a state employee in the 1970s. In 1979, the Iraqi Ba'athist government of Saddam Hussein was preparing their country for a war with Iran. In so doing they were engaged in motivating Iraqi citizens to enlist in the military and head towards the front lines. However, during this period Haji Karim was more interested in joining the Kurdish Peshmerga force, who had by then taken advantage of Iraq - Iran was and increased their control over Iraqi Kurdistan's rural centres. Even though he was a revolutionary militant in the early 1970s, he was also engaged in the internal civil war between the Iraqi-Kurdish political parties of the time. 
At the close of the 1980s, the second Kurdish rebellion against the Iraqi government collapsed. Haji Karim did not have the resources to flee after the failed revolution. Thus, he once again decided to migrate to the cities. From his new residence, the Iraqi government drafted him into the Iraqi army, the thing he most feared. He was mobilised to the front lines to support Saddam's attempt to annex Kuwait. 

Following the First Gulf War, the Kurdish Peshmerga instigated a successful uprising in Iraqi Kurdistan taking control of much of Iraqi Kurdistan from Iraqi forces. When news of the rebellion reached Haji Karim, he fled the Iraqi army and returned to his peshmerga friends and took an active role in the uprising. The first few days began with looting and anarchy. Haji Karim joined the looters so that he could take what he believed to be fair compensation from the Iraqi government for destroying his village and livelihood so that he could use his gains to settle down with a family. In the years that followed, the Kurdish civil-war broke out between the two dominant Kurdish political parties the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan and the Kurdistan Democratic Party. During the war, Haji Karim supported one of the sides. 
In the aftermath of the war, Iraqi Kurdistan's economy had only grown enough to support small enterprise; therefore, the state sector remained the only secure employment for residents. Haji Karim returned to his previous position as a state employee; however, his employer this time was not the Iraqi government but the Kurdistan Regional Government. He then married and had children. The continuation of competition, problems and insecurity on the macro-level in Iraq (for example between the Kurdistan Region Government and the Iraqi Federal Government) prevented Haji Karim from establishing a secure partnership with his spouse. He felt that he only remained in his marriage due to a lack of alternatives. 
When reading Haji Karim's biography, it is clear that while Haji Karim's children live a better economic situation, he is plagued by illness. Haji Karim's biography is not unique but similar to that of thousands of other Kurdish residents. Residents who had no choice but to change their lives and try to adjust to new governments through trying to unify their skills and abilities with the requirements of the modern business world, often ones that were not necessarily compatible. 

Whether they decided to remain in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq or reside elsewhere, these individuals now live in a state of constant anxiety and depression. They are resent their past and present situations and find it difficult to change their social status. Their heartbreak is such that they have now all but given up. Instead, they spend their time praying to guarantee a better life in the hereafter. 
The last fifty years of history between the Kurdistan Region of Iraq and Federal Iraq demonstrates that both geographies and the families within them have been in a perpetual state of competition - one that promotes destruction, rivalry, and war. This state has, in turn, developed an unstable economy that leaps from one crisis to another.
Hence, the question this article asks is, why is it that two parts of the same country, Iraq and it's Kurdistan Region, can neither peacefully coexist or peacefully separate? 

The central argument of the paper is that there are non-state agencies behind the behaviour of individuals, social groups and political elites in Iraq and its Kurdistan Region. These agencies promote dishonesty and deception between the two sides and motivate each to take advantage of the other. The angel-devil analysis (Kurdistan Region of Iraq being the angel and Iraq being the devil) can no longer be used to find a way through to peaceful coexistence. 

The rest of the article divides as follows: section two is a theoretical summary of the failure of friendly relations. Section three explains the collapse of relationships at the macro and micro levels. Section four, the causes behind the stalling and collapse of Ties. The last section sets out the conclusions. 

Institutions stalling and the failure of friendship
The coexistence of individuals is not a simple process. Individuals need leadership to increase their communal abilities, to lead a suitable life and to behave decently towards themselves and their surroundings. There are several reasons behind the promotion of isolationism and hatred, leading to individuals and groups into conflict with one another. 
The primary role of institutions is to establish restrictions on personal benefits. Institutions set boundaries for individual and group power accumulation. However, weak institutions provide a vacuum that allows politicians and bureaucrats to accumulate power. It restricts economic growth simplifying the process of money-making with minimal effort. (1)
Francesca (2) discusses the importance of institutions as follows: "The development of institutions appears to create a suitable environment that adapts cooperation to one that resolves problems in a manner that accelerates economic growth". In contrast, greed, deception, short-term gain thinking slows economic growth and increases the chance of financial crisis significantly. 
Douglass North (3), a Nobel prize winner on economics, makes clear that institutions require three central pillars. First, formal laws as they represent the code to peaceful coexistence. He argues that in a democratic system, there is room to design and implement legal codes. Second, informal laws - norms of behaviour that support peaceful coexistence between individuals. These norms could have been passed down from past generations, arise from the culture of a social group, or created, changed and maintained from the practice of coexistence itself. These norms establish themselves in the individual psyche and thus allow them to survive and evolve. Therefore, with respect to behaviour, they influence personal choices and motives. 
While formal laws are still imperative, the third element is also essential. The third element, which is often the government, implements the law. The policies and regulations of the government can become subject to the influence of informal laws (norms and customs). Douglass North explains that where a government has the characteristics of a mafia, it can always prevent development as a problem of agency arises as a result. For example, where a representative of the people behaves like a mafia or is controlled by other mafia groups, development gets prevented or regressed. Therefore, Douglass North argues that the struggle for freedom can not separate from the need for government to be free from mafia interference. As we will see later, the establishment of a rentier state has been a part of Iraq since its establishment. 
Economically, this theory paved the way for other theories on economic development to take forward strides. Adam Smith and other classicist thinkers, like Maltos, argued that accumulation of wealth is the first step to enrich the nation and allow for economic development. However, Adam Smith requires free markets and professionalism, while Maltos reminds us that an increase in population size is the threat to economic growth and development. Marx believed that capitalism could create continued economic development. 
In this regard, Douglas North added value to the body of theories. He argued that on the one hand, institutions could reduce the hegemony of capital over labour and, on the other, that free markets were a threat as openness allowed for the development of non-personal connections. Without the development of agency, these connections could not be organised and would see exploitation and subjugation substitute collaboration and cooperation. In turn, going forward, this leads to a change from open markets to closed ones. Here, the state is the highest authority and can both promote or inhibit growth. If the state can establish the right to private ownership, protect individuals, not follow the individual interests of those behind the levers of government, and can prevent personal greed from turning into the exploitation of the other, then this is a strong sign that economic growth can occur. However, a state with weak institutions can become a space for individuals and groups to attempt to control the market for their interests. It disrupts professionalism and sees individuals take on jobs that have no experience or education to support the role, ultimately leading them to corruption. 
Such a problem can last decades and even centuries. Listed below are the five reasons as to why I have focussed on the stalling of agency,  

Path Dependence;
Neighbour influence;
The cost of escape and entering relationships;
Collective action and the price of a solution;
International rivalry.

The first and second points will be discussed thoroughly, but the rest will either be addressed briefly or will not be discussed as they do not fall into the scope of this paper. 
Before discussing these points, it is essential to point out some perspectives on the failure of friendship and unhealthy relationships on the micro and macro levels. 
The failure of friendships: Faces
Kurdish novelist, Bakhtiar Ali, described the failure if relationships in his 1998 novel (قەسیدەی عەشقد). He wrote; "Oh beloved, in the time of predators, make me your prey, as I have come to make you mine."
In this poetic image, Bakhtiar Ali depicts the will of lovers to exploit one another. From marriage through political party relations to inter-governmental relations, predatory, misleading and fraudulent behaviour has, for decades, been the main characteristic of relations in Iraq (and probably throughout the modern world). In this regard, differentiating between the political, social and business spheres is not essential if one wants only to demonstrate the failure of relationships on the micro and macro levels in Iraq. This paper will begin with the breakdown of relationships within Iraqi families. 
In 2017, there were more than 9,000 divorces registered in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq. This number is notable as it was three times higher than the number of divorces recorded in 2016. One of the leading causes of divorce was infidelity and "openness". According to the records, 39 percent of divorces occurred because spouses could not get along with one another. Nineteen percent occurred because of economic restraints; 10 percent because of infidelity and 19 percent as a direct result of access to new technologies, which was a descrives as a cause of temptation and also an enabler for spouses to spy on one another. (4)
Similarly, an observation of the Kurdish civil war reveals that there were two key moments of conflict between the Kurdish political parties towards internal war, one between the 1970s and the 1980s, and the other between 1992 and 1995. There has also been a continuous cold war between them, which has grown to include political parties and political party splinters. 
Bloodshed and was has been a constant feature over the decades in relations between Iraqi Kurdistan and the region. The last chapter of this contempt occurred following the removal of the former Iraqi dictator, Saddam Hussein, from power. Here, I wish to layout a part of this narrative. 
After 2005, there was notable economic development in Iraq and its Kurdistan Region. Whatever the reason for this development, after establishing a legal framework for the division of income and finances, the governments in both jurisdictions entered into a prolonged period of friendly relations. The 2005 Iraqi constitution established that the Kurdistan Regional of Iraq would receive 17 percent of Iraq's total budget, the first time the relationship with Baghdad advantaged the Iraqi Kurds. However, the elements of centralised planning continued. Until now, fiscal policy remains in the hands of the Iraqi Federal Government with minimal involvement of the Kurdistan Regional Government. This is the same with Iraqi economic policy. Within the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, the leadership mirrored Baghdad, by centralising financial planning. 
A few years after the Kurdistan Regional Government passed laws and exported oil independent of Baghdad, the Iraq Federal Government decided to cut the Kurdish share of the Iraqi budget, resulting in a new episode of hostility. When, as a result of this Iraqi decision, the Kurdistan Region succumbed to a financial crisis, the Iraqi Federal Government did not shoulder any responsibility for the crisis. Fueling this animosity further was the Kurdistan Regional Government's resistance to sending its oil revenues to Baghdad to be redistributed as per the Iraqi constitution. The regional government also refused nor has the region worked in partnership with Baghdad to create a joint economic policy (oil, financial, business). 
Iraqi legal amendments, such as the drawing up of the 2005 Iraqi constitution, shows another facet of this animosity between the two sides. Alexander Dawoody (5) writes that when the 2005 Iraqi constitution being written, the Iraqi Shia's, Sunni's and Kurdish leaders contributed to the process based on sectarian and ethnic lines. Each leader made demands for articles to be included in the constitution that was self-serving and not serving of a constitution that would allow Iraq to function as a united state. Put another way, during the process; little thought was given to inter-ethnic and inter-sectarian cooperation or mutual beneficial articles, each side wanted to write the constitution in their respective favours. Ultimately, this led to a weakened Sunni population boycotting the referendum to adopt the constitution and election of the first federal Iraqi government in 2005. Since then, significant problems remain around article 111 and article 112 of the constitution regarding oil sales. As was set out in the theory, the existence of formal laws is essential; however, the ability to implement the law is more important. Once again, animosity between the two sides has replaced cooperation. 
Article 9 of the Iraqi constitution banned the formation and existence of militias; however, neither government could implement this article as they did not have power over the elites and political parties under there respective authorities. This demonstrates that a government of agencies and institutions does not exist in Iraq. The same is true for all issues surrounding Article 140 and the subject of the Iraqi disputed territories. 

The stalling of agency and the failure of cooperation: cause
The establishment of Iraq in the 1920s was the beginnings of a new social arrangement between the different social groups in Iraq, in particular the two largest social groups, the Kurds and the Arabs. From the onset, shortcomings and failures beset the new Iraqi national project. 
In another of my papers, titled "The failure of economic reform …" (6) I discussed that the central reason for the blocking of sustained economic development in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq is a "non-civil tradition", rentierism and centralisation. These factors feed off one another, with one creating or exacerbating the other. Here, I wish to discuss the causes behind each of these factors. 

Path dependence
The state of today is, to a great extent, tied to history. The path of history is a chain of interlinked and compounded events. In Iraq, and the Kurdistan Region of Iraq this path has seen planned centralisation turn individuals into tools and not objectives. It has also allowed rentierism to create a political culture that prevents society from uniting. 
The economic collapse and retrenchment of the 1940s opened the doors to centralised government in Iraq. Kamran Matin explains that since the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, successive empires and regimes that have controlled Iraq have consistently failed to implement a national program in Iraq. A combination of factors in each period led to cooperation between the most influential groups in the country. Among them, the landowners, tribal leaders and political elites. Hence the people of Iraq have always looked back to regimes gone and not governments to come. 
In truth, institutions in their most basic form in Iraq were extensions of their pre-modern models. In the period of the Iraqi monarchy (1921 - 1958) members of parliament were seen as tribal, ethnic and sectarian leaders. If they were from a strong tribe, they would have a robust parliamentary influence. After 1958, the Iraqi parliament became a one-party institution, and following 2003 the parliament in Iraq and the Kurdistan Region of Iraq became hostage to the power of political parties and their leaders. 
The division of Iraqi society by the Iraqi Ba'ath party began with a simple division of those that supported the revolution and those that did not. Those who did not fall in line with the party was considered to be against the revolution. As a result, they were branded as "traitor" and punished. The priority of the Iraqi Baath party was to establish an equal society; thus, it was expected of Iraqi citizens to forgo their ambitions and support behind the goals of the Ba'ath party leader. The promise was that if they did so, they would reach the edges of happiness. (8) Through this rhetoric, the Ba'ath party focused its government on building up its military capabilities. In the first year of the Iran-Iraq war, military spending in Iraq was at 70 percent of Iraqi GDP. To receive a mandate over society and acceptance for the political party to accept its policies, the party leader made use of two other techniques. It needed to prepare the country for war and war-making. 
The fall of Iraq's agrarian society, the fall of the Iraqi monarchy and the expulsion of the Jews from Iraq in the late 1940s, were a chain of events that saw the Iraq economy transit to a rentier oil-dependent economy. One of the consequences of this transition was a process of urbanisation in Iraq, which saw the migration of Iraq's population into the country's cities, transforming the country's economy. (9) This time the societal groups in Iraq had little choice but to follow the leaders of the Iraqi Baath party, rather than becoming independent businessmen. Iraqi Government Policy restricted business, closed Iraq's borders to individual business activity and limited access to the global economy, ultimately limited Iraq's capability to develop new business ideas. The Iraqi Baath party reduced the scope of the business, thereby bringing the country's economy under the influence of the government and Baath party institutions. Step by step, the state gained experience in all sectors and established policies against private ownership. The country's population became professionals in preserving the system. Kamran Matin explains "the army took the place of the nation, the political party took the place of the army, the political party leaders took the place of political parties and ultimately Saddam Hussein took the place of the entirety of the Iraqi community". 

In the process of war preparation, war-making, centralisation and bureaucratisation "the priority was conflict". Isam al-Khafaji explains, "a mandate was given to the governing elite to centralise planning and control the division of national income". This contributed to the creation of a political culture that favoured the county's political elite, whose power over the population continued to expand. The same pattern reemerged after the removal of Saddam Hussein. 
Hence, connecting the past and present was centralisation in a new form. This time it was a large state under the authority of political parties. Similar to the 1970s, the same chain of events reoccurred in the 1990s. Kurdish leaders were powerless to stop this pattern from reemerging. Administratively, the same culture of centralisation; economically, the same dependence on oil; and politically, the same political model remerged (everything is in the shadow of the leader and for the leader!). Iraq witnessed the arrival of more than 45 oil companies from 17 different countries. As I have previously explained, this new economy changed the motivation of the Kurdish leadership to one focused around satisfying oil companies rather than the people of Iraq. In truth, the institutions of state were set up in infatuation with the leader. The institutions are expected to represent the dreams, visions and wishes of the leader. It is for this reason when a leader steps down or passes away, these institutions are left in shock, with some collapsing. 
In such an environment, political leaders extend their reach to all corners of the country. It is not a coincidence that some academics in state universities support one party leader or another. Here, academic institutions and schools can no longer be considered as centres for human and cultural development. As evidence for the poor state of the county's public universities, one need only look to the academics' writing and researching skills. In some university departments, students write university dissertations in groups of five. Where they write their research paper in Arabic, they likely do not understand what they are writing. (10) Political parties and the groups within, require propaganda machines to maintain their image. Students believe their future employment prospects are not tied to their education but political affiliation and connections. Even within these state-funded academic centres decision-making is done centrally with minimal participation from outside the centre. I want to stress that the process of education has seen significant changes in Kurdistan over the last few years with the opening fifteen private universities. However, this does not change the reality that dozens of institutions remain under the control of a few individuals who have no intention to provide opportunities to expand institutional freedoms. 
Here the bigger problem is revealed: humans are beings that are capable of change. They can change from altruists to egoists; hence the scope for development is locked. Managing egoists is difficult as a relationship based on mutual trust, mutual understanding and peaceful resolution can not be established with them.  
This is one reason why Iraqis cannot resolve their differences, let alone coexist. From the media to academia, mosques to political parties, this state is perpetuated in a manner that individuals are prepared to lay down their own lives and the lives of their opponents for it. 
While the current economic situation is better than that of the past, communal life is filled with problems. This has consequently worked to reduce the economic situation of individuals and leading them into successive sharp and deep financial crises. 

The effect of neighbours
The previous section was not intended to present an image in which no strides had been taken towards development. One barrier towards progress is the effect of neighbours, or "others", as I will call them. 
In the first quarter of the 20th century, when the power of the United States was on the rise, it called for the independence of nations. Fearing independence, the British and French colonial forces in the Middle East divided the region. They established the state of Iraq, with a portion of Kurdistan attached to this new country. (11) 
As a country, Iraq is surrounded by neighbouring states with totalitarian regimes, allowing for the excuse "the others also do the same thing" when responding to criticisms regarding their form of government. This is especially the case in Iraq, Syria, Iran and Turkey. 
In Syria in 1970, there were thirteen soldiers for every 1000 citizens. This number increased to 35 soldiers in the 1980s. (12) Khomeini's success, the increase in Shia influence and the fall of the Pahlavi dynasty at the close of the 1970s in Iran, in one respects, was caused by the economic strategy of its neighbours and that of Israel. Israel's military spending exponentially increased, creating a militarised state under the banner of national security. Here, each state copied the model of their neighbouring state, regardless of the religious or cultural backdrop of the given state. Therefore, it was not easy for Iraq or the Kurdistan Region of Iraq to present a new system in such an atmosphere. It was difficult for them to establish a political system that respects humanity, animals or the environment or indeed create a society that served towards equality and democratisation. Instead, the regional conditions provided an opportunity for the political elite to push towards authoritarianism. 
Under this condition, just as we discussed on the micro-level regarding how husbands and wives succumb to tribal pressures not to seek legal resolutions that could lead them to divorce, similar forces are applied to Iraq's Kurds to remain apart of Iraq. A group of tribal states that neighbour Iraq and its Kurdistan Region cannot tolerate the idea of a Kurdish separation from Iraq. Within these states, the rule of law has no sovereignty and does not have a place in society. For example, when two cars collide the best resolution for those involves is mediation between the parties involved. When citizens in these states come into conflict with one another, the law plays a limited role in resolving their problems. To solve their problems, they return to their tribal elders to assist in resolution. Resolutions are often reached between the elders based on family and tribal interests, rather than that right or wrongs. 

Politicly, the same pattern reemerges between organisations. What are the results? It is difficult for political parties and elites to seek legal resolutions to resolve problems between themselves. Furthermore, they cannot find legal action against external players who interfere in internal Kurdish affairs. It is for this reason that elites and political parties try to preserve themselves through power accumulation by aligning themselves to one of their respective neighbouring states. Kamran Matin example assists with this point; he explains that the Iraqi Shia community aligns with Iran and the Iraqi Sunni community aligns with Saudi Arabia in order to preserve their positions in Iraq. (13)
Just as tribal and family members interfere and mediate to prevent couples from seeking a divorce, to protect the institution of marriage and prevent other couples from seeking the same solution to their marriage problems; the same is the case for ethnic separatism as the host state fears for its wider sovereignty. The separation of the Iraqi Kurds from Iraq risks not only motivating the Kurds of Iran, Syria and Turkey from seeking the same resolution but also other ethnicities around the world trying to separate from their hast states. By taking this state of international politics, the design of the "Kurdish independence referendum" was a big mistake. 
Even though this issue is outside of the scope of this article, Russia and the United States played significant roles in the collapse of the Iraqi and Iranian states. At one stage they assisted at the expense of the other. Their sanctioning of Iraq handed power to the tribes and elites to maintain hunger and unemployment. 

Other Causes
Two other causes have a direct relationship with the stalling of development; the first is collective action. As we discussed earlier in this section, it has a significant impact on collective action. In a society where uncivilised traditions are dominant, corruption is accepted, and equality is seen as being above the norm. The system is centralised, individuals are on the periphery, while the leader is in the centre. Therefore, it is difficult for collective action to occur. (14) The second is the cost of escape. There may come a specific moment where the price of flight from a relationship to more costly than coexistence. (15) On the other hand, peaceful coexistence is not easy when it is compounded couples are fatigued within relationships. 
Within coexistence, one of the strategies of individuals and powers is for each to increase its share of the benefits and income they gain from the relationship. Often through "I have sacrificed more; hence i deserve the lions share in opportunities and income". (16) Fanar Haddad believes that relations between the Iraqi Sunni, Shia and Kurdish communities are based around the principle of victimhood politics. This strategy sees one party attempting to dominate the other and vice-versa. For this purpose, the most horrendous tactics are mandated, be them sanctioning the other or entering military confrontations with them. 
Fear of the power expansion by the other sees them mutually restraining each others independence and ability to exert power. On the micro and macro levels (couples, political parties, and governments) all sides implement this strategy as they are guided by the fear of one another, even though the sides are deeply connected and cannot separate from one another. More important, is maintaining rations and togetherness and that both parties must have the ability to seek legal resolution against the other if it impedes on the former's constitutional rights. In the relationship between Iraq and the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, the former can seek legal action against the latter; however, the Kurdistan Region of Iraq cannot do the same against Federal Iraq. This fact works to motivate the Kurdistan region to act against federal Iraq. In short, just as they can not peacefully separate, these two parties cannot peacefully coexist  

Conclusion
Whenever a nation increases its openness, new forms of communication arise—the transition from personal relationships in trade to non-personal relationships effects social and political relationships. 
In the modern history of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, initially, oil brought the rural and suburban populations to the cities. This migration was followed by forced migration. During Iraq's third regime, following the collapse of Saddam Hussein's regime, Iraq and the Kurdistan Region of Iraq opened their borders to the international community. The institutions failed to update themselves with the same haste, causing further competition and conflict: between married couples, between urban and rural communities, between cities, between governments etc. While the sides in each of these relationships desire separation, they do not have the opportunity to do so. In the same vein, they are not able to coexist peacefully or truthfully, support one another, and replace their hatred with a spirit of togetherness. 
Iraqi individuals, including Kurds, have witnessed war, destruction and totalitarian organisations extending to education and academia. This experience has limited individual ability to coexist together peacefully, not to extort one another, to resolve their problems quickly or indeed to find a path to separation with the least amount of damage and not to become enemies of one another after. 

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9. Kamran Matin, i bid. 

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11. I bid

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13. Ibid.

14.نیاز نەجمەدین، کێ چارەنوس دیاری دەکات؟ لێکۆڵینەوە لە گەشەسەندنی مرۆیی و نایەکسانیی ئابورییە لە هەرێمی کوردستاندا،٢٠١٩، دەزگای چاپی کارۆ ، سلێمانی، وەزارەتی رۆشنبیریی.
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