By Sardar Aziz
Introduction
This research aims to lay out the character of the relationship
between Iran and Iraq by observing two specific moments in the history of both
nations. Each of these two periods is considered changing points in the history
of each nation. For Iran, this period began with the collapse of the Shah,
while for Iraq this period began with the collapse of Saddam Hussain’s regime.
The central questions to be discussed are:
Why did both nations begin interfering in the internal affairs of
the other during these periods?
What were their motivations and aims in their attempts to
interfere?
Can these two time periods character assist in laying out the
relationship between Iran and Iraq?
One research reveals that both nations are incredibly crucial to
one another and that both nations are at the same time engaged in a conflict
against one another. Hence, it can be argued that regarding Iran’s security and
economy, as well as its regional role and status Iraq is the most important of
Iran’s neighbours; and the same applies from the Iraqi perspective. A large
part of the importance of this relationship is regarding the fact that Iran
pays more attention to regional rather than global politics (1).
Therefore, given that regional politics is the most important
aspect of Iranian foreign policy, in this regard Iraq has the most critical
status in Iran’s policymaking. So much so, that Iraq is a part of the Iranian
national identity regarding religion, behaviour, culture, and worldview; and
the same applies from the Iraqi perspective.
This argument concludes that one cannot directly attribute the
relationship between the two nations, in particular, Iran’s policy towards
Iraq, to a single causal factor, such as ideology, supremacy or security,
alone.
Background
Throughout history, the territory of Iraq has played a significant
role and meaning to Iran. History has seen this territory form a part of Iran,
become a theatre of Iranian conflict with other nations, and become a territory
that poses a severe risk to Iran (2). While this history has fused
Iraq and its people with Iran’s national identity, Iraq plays a more
significant role in Iranian foreign policy on account of its geography. Iraq,
which is a relatively new, wealthy, but unstable state shares the majority of
its eastern border with Iran. While this Iraq state is currently undergoing the
early phases of its development, Iran has played a significant role in the
process of the founding of the Iraqi identity. Iran has influenced the Iraqi
identity during its Arab nationalist, Sunni Arab and expansionist periods. What is more, this same Iranian policy can
continue to influence a decentralised and weak Iraq in the aftermath of the
collapse of the regime of Saddam Hussein.
Therefore, if going forward, Iraq chooses to behave as a part of
the Arab world or as a Sunni Arab entity, then it will view Iran as ‘the
other’. If, on the other hand, Iraq
works independently of any collective identity to become a strong international
state, then once again it will view Iran as 'the other’. By the term ‘the
other’ this research refers to the presence of an international difference,
making two nations view each other as enemies and threats. What is more, if
Iran is Iraq’s ‘other’, then Iraq has in many historical periods been Iran’s
‘other’, especially after the establishment of Iraq as an independent state.
This was evidenced by the difficulty Iran initially had with accepting the new
Iraqi state.
The instability of the Iraqi state has in many ways presented a
threat to Iranian security as it has presented an opportunity to international
superpowers to take advantage of the instability to enforce their respective
regional agendas. For example, during the Cold War, the Soviet Union took
advantage of Iraqi instability, while the United States did so in the post-Cold
War era, both of which was to the dissatisfaction of Iran.
However, a number of facts may reveal more about the relationship
between Iraq and Iran. The majority of the populations of both states live
close to the borders of both states, meaning that the majority of Iran’s
population lives near the Iraq borders, while the majority of the Iraqi
population lives near the Iranian border. This concentration of the population
on both sides of the border has made both nations more wary of one another,
interns of security threats than they are towards any other of their respective
neighbouring states. Moreover, regarding each nation access to natural
resources and economic systems, they both rely overwhelmingly on the sale of
oil creating a natural rivalry between both nations regarding access to markets
and buyers. What is more, they both also have similar economic systems. Even
though Iran has tried to distance itself from rentierism to become a producing
nation in response to the numerous economic sanctions that the international
community has imposed on it, both nations continue to have rentier-state
economic models making their economic systems almost identical. This economic
reality may provide the foundation in answering the question can Iraq be made
to resemble Iran? Such a process of political, demographic, cultural and
governmental transformation of Iraq to resemble Iran is a part of the Iranian
foreign policy to end the four-century long rivalry that has existed between
the two nations.
Here, this research can move onto another level of its argument,
which is that if Iraq is the most significant nation to Iran in regards to
shared borders, rivalry, economic system and conflicting ideologies, then the
alteration of these causal factors must become the primary concern of Iran in
respect to the preservation of Iran’s national security. Therefore, the rivalry
between both states has been in a manner that both have waited for opportune
moments to defeat the other and end the four-century long rivalry that has
existed between them. For both nations, this opportunity presented itself
during 'the others' moment of regime change.
Two Historic Moments: The Fall of the Shah in Iran and the Collapse
of the Saddam Hussain Regime in Iraq
According to Abdul-Wahat al-Qasab, the Iraqi aim in attacking Iran
was to interfere in Iranian affairs in many ways so that it could secure
security and dominance for Iraq in the wider region. Al-Qassab argues that the
Iraqi aims were: (1) To prevent the export of the Iranian Revolution to Iraq;
(2) To end the Algiers Agreement; (3) to end the Algiers Agreement: (4) to
strengthen the internal front; (5) to showcase the ability of the Iraqi army;
(6) to make Iraq the dominant regional power; (7) to weaken the Iranian regime;
(8) to retrieve previously lost Iraqi land; (9) to defeat the Iranian
army; (10) to liberate Khuzistan
Province; and (11) to present Iraq as a regional power.
These aims reveal the thinking of the Iraqi government, in that
they believed that the emergence of Iraq as a regional power was dependent on
the weakening and non-existence of Iran as a regional power. Therefore, the
Iraqis focused on the methods that they could employ to weaken the Iranian
regime, its strength, and its economy to the extent that the threat posed by
Iran to Iraq diminished or that Iraq becomes the undisputed dominant regional
power (3).
Using the same argument in respect to Iranian desires is possible.
Where Iraq saw fit the opportunity
presented by the fall of the Shah to challenge, attack and weaken Iran, so that
it could make itself the dominant regional power, so too Iran saw the fall of
the Saddam Hussain regime as the prime moment to challenge Iraqi power through
political interference to convert Iraq from enemy to a supplement to Iranian
regional hegemony. In this respect, Iran approached the collapse of the Saddam
Hussain regime on numerous levels to attempt to change the foundations of the
Iraqi state. The Iranian method to
change Iraq’s character began with the forced withdrawal of US troops from Iraq
and continued with their support for Shi’a hegemony in the country, the
formation of a governing system that was characterised by its personalities,
its forces, its agencies and its forms of warfare.
Both histories once again revealed how important each state was to
the other. However, if for Iraq victory over Iran was enough to make it a
regional power, the same cannot be said for the Iranians. The collapse of
Saddam Hussein’s regime was not only an opportunity for Iran to compete for
regional dominance, but also for other regional powers, especially Saudi
Arabia.
Where Saudi Arabia supported the project to strengthen Iraq so that
it could once again counter Iranian power, the Iranians had to become concerned
with preventing the existence of a new Iraq under Saudi Arabian influence. This
Saudi Arabian and Iranian dispute has given way to the current region-wide
Sunni-Shia conflict in the Middle East, which like most Islamic sectarian conflict is historically
played out on Iraqi soil. Iraq’s vulnerability in this context is due to its
position in Islamic history as the place of the emergence of the Sunni-Shia
divide.
According to Shia literature and the perspective of Iran, the
Shia-Sunni conflict is one between the empowered and the not empowered or one
between those who have taken power unjustly and those who have had power taken
from them unjustly. This perspective serves to demonstrate that the sectarian
conflict in Islam is not a rivalry over religious viewpoints but a conflict
between two groups over the governance of the religion, which to support their
respected positions have established separate interpretations and sects. What
is more, while the politicisation of the dispute continues, it has a new veil
in recent times. While Iraq is the stage
in which the conflict between these two forces to justify their respective
positions and to impose their dominance over Islam is played out. The role of
territory in this conflict is significant as it is a conflict fought between a
minority and a majority population. The question then becomes: how can such
geography become so that the minority can become the dominant power within it,
and allow it to impose its will over it while being able to continue in its
dominance?
The answer to this question rests on one of the deep and complex
Iranian regional and international policy questions, which is: If Iran is to
survive as a state does it require an imperialist model of governance?
Alternatively, to what extent is the regional and foreign policy of Iran driven
by ideological factors? According to Ramazani ideology and pragmatism have
worked together in Iranian regional and international policy-making (4).
In the view of this research, the ideological and imperial nature
of Iranian regional and foreign policy are interconnected on many levels. It
allows Iran to influence the governance of others in a way that serves Irans
best interests. Moreover, it also allows
Iran to influence the populations of those areas to live their lives in
accordance with Iranian values. Therefore, the ideological nature of Iran’s
regional and foreign policy is in many respects the same as governance by an
imperial system.
Of course, given that Iran does not have the means to become an
imperial state internationally; its current ambition is to become an imperial
state regionally. The roots of these ambitions are deep-rooted, running through
Iranian history. First, when Iran views its history, it notes that over time
its territory continues to shrink, especially as Iran topography shows that
today Iran sits inside a chain of mountains, which if penetrated puts the
entire Iranian state at risk. Second, due to its Islamic nature, Iran feels
that it is in an isolated position compared to the international system,
especially since relations of between it and the United States collapsed in the
immediate aftermath of the Islamic Revolution. This position has placed Iran
into the category of rogue states in the eyes of the international community.
This general categorisation has reduced the international opportunities before
Iran, forcing it to focus more on the Middle East region to stamp its presence
on the internal community and to protect itself from potential aggressors.
However, Takeyh argues that, if Iran is forced to rely on models of imperialism
to protect itself, then at the same time this model holds the seeds of future
failure for Iran (5).
Conclusion
This research was primarily an attempt to discuss the relations
between Iran and Iraq via the ring fencing of two unique
and significant events, which were the fall of the Shah in Iran and the fall of
the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq. This research was conducted primarily to
answer the questions: why did both nations begin interfering in the internal
affairs of the other during these periods? Also, what were their motivations
and aims in their attempts to interfere?
The Iraqi government viewed the collapse of the Shah as an
opportune moment to weaken Iran via an attack. The Iraqi government saw such a
weakening of Iran a geopolitical shift that would give Iraq hegemony in the
Middle East. In the same manner as Iraq, Iran views the collapse of the Saddam
Hussain regime as an opportune moment for the Iranian government to intervene
in Iraqi affairs to transform it from an enemy state to one that is closely
aligned with Iran. With this objective, the Iranians began a multi-level policy
towards Iraq to change the foundations of the Iraqi state via the forced
withdrawal of US troops from Iraq, and continued with their support for Shi’a
hegemony in the country, the formation of a governing system that was
characterised by its personal characters, its forces, its agencies and its
forms of warfare.
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