By Dr Niaz Najmadin
Haji Karim, a Kurdish national born in 1960, answer to one of my questions may
be a good way to open discussion on this subject:
a hot summer's day in 1986, a group of our relatives and friends came to visit
us in our village, which was approximately a three-hour walk from theirs. They
came to help us harvest the tobacco crops that we had grown in our fields. Our
relatives stayed with us for almost a week and by the end were pretty tired.
Over the seven days, we were unable to provide a single full meal for them.
However, we still enjoyed our time working in the fields together immensely. In
the evenings, we rested by playing folk games. We were eager to display our
affection and kindness towards one another, as business and money were not
motivations. Our relatives took no payment for the work they did for us. This
practice was the same in all nearby villages as the currency between us was
trust. However, two to three years later, all of the nearby villages were
flattened by war and had little choice but to migrate to the cities.
Unfortunately, I feel these that trust, respect and collective action that was
so important in the villages have since faded away. In many respects, I was
happier in those days that I was today in 2018."
is worth me directing your attention to the fact that thrift was not the cause
of Haji Karim's period of poverty but a consequence of the poor economic
conditions of the time. More importantly, at the end of the week, when Haji
Karim returned to the ranks of the Peshmerga revolutionaries, food and
resources were scarce outside of the urban centres. Smoke from oil fields had
darkened the skies over the cities, and its promise had begun to attract the
attention of the political elites and bureaucrats promising a better future for
the nation. This quick historical summary makes one of the objectives of this
discussion clear: the culture of defrauding and fleecing took over from the
culture of cooperation in Iraq and Iraqi Kurdistan, in particular after the
short excerpt of Haji Karim's biography makes clear the other objectives of
this discussion. Although he was unable to receive a school qualification, he
gained employment as a state employee in the 1970s. In 1979, the Iraqi
Ba'athist government of Saddam Hussein was preparing their country for a war
with Iran. In so doing they were engaged in motivating Iraqi citizens to enlist
in the military and head towards the front lines. However, during this period
Haji Karim was more interested in joining the Kurdish Peshmerga force, who had
by then taken advantage of Iraq - Iran was and increased their control over
Iraqi Kurdistan's rural centres. Even though he was a revolutionary militant in
the early 1970s, he was also engaged in the internal civil war between the
Iraqi-Kurdish political parties of the time.
the close of the 1980s, the second Kurdish rebellion against the Iraqi
government collapsed. Haji Karim did not have the resources to flee after the
failed revolution. Thus, he once again decided to migrate to the cities. From
his new residence, the Iraqi government drafted him into the Iraqi army, the
thing he most feared. He was mobilised to the front lines to support Saddam's
attempt to annex Kuwait.
the First Gulf War, the Kurdish Peshmerga instigated a successful uprising in
Iraqi Kurdistan taking control of much of Iraqi Kurdistan from Iraqi forces.
When news of the rebellion reached Haji Karim, he fled the Iraqi army and
returned to his peshmerga friends and took an active role in the uprising. The
first few days began with looting and anarchy. Haji Karim joined the looters so
that he could take what he believed to be fair compensation from the Iraqi
government for destroying his village and livelihood so that he could use his
gains to settle down with a family. In the years that followed, the Kurdish
civil-war broke out between the two dominant Kurdish political parties the
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan and the Kurdistan Democratic Party. During the
war, Haji Karim supported one of the sides.
the aftermath of the war, Iraqi Kurdistan's economy had only grown enough to
support small enterprise; therefore, the state sector remained the only secure
employment for residents. Haji Karim returned to his previous position as a
state employee; however, his employer this time was not the Iraqi government
but the Kurdistan Regional Government. He then married and had children. The
continuation of competition, problems and insecurity on the macro-level in Iraq
(for example between the Kurdistan Region Government and the Iraqi Federal
Government) prevented Haji Karim from establishing a secure partnership with
his spouse. He felt that he only remained in his marriage due to a lack of
reading Haji Karim's biography, it is clear that while Haji Karim's children
live a better economic situation, he is plagued by illness. Haji Karim's
biography is not unique but similar to that of thousands of other Kurdish
residents. Residents who had no choice but to change their lives and try to
adjust to new governments through trying to unify their skills and abilities
with the requirements of the modern business world, often ones that were not
they decided to remain in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq or reside elsewhere,
these individuals now live in a state of constant anxiety and depression. They
are resent their past and present situations and find it difficult to change
their social status. Their heartbreak is such that they have now all but given
up. Instead, they spend their time praying to guarantee a better life in the
last fifty years of history between the Kurdistan Region of Iraq and Federal
Iraq demonstrates that both geographies and the families within them have been
in a perpetual state of competition - one that promotes destruction, rivalry,
and war. This state has, in turn, developed an unstable economy that leaps from
one crisis to another.
the question this article asks is, why is it that two parts of the same
country, Iraq and it's Kurdistan Region, can neither peacefully coexist or
central argument of the paper is that there are non-state agencies behind the
behaviour of individuals, social groups and political elites in Iraq and its
Kurdistan Region. These agencies promote dishonesty and deception between the
two sides and motivate each to take advantage of the other. The angel-devil
analysis (Kurdistan Region of Iraq being the angel and Iraq being the devil)
can no longer be used to find a way through to peaceful coexistence.
rest of the article divides as follows: section two is a theoretical summary of
the failure of friendly relations. Section three explains the collapse of
relationships at the macro and micro levels. Section four, the causes behind
the stalling and collapse of Ties. The last section sets out the conclusions.
stalling and the failure of friendship
coexistence of individuals is not a simple process. Individuals need leadership
to increase their communal abilities, to lead a suitable life and to behave
decently towards themselves and their surroundings. There are several reasons
behind the promotion of isolationism and hatred, leading to individuals and
groups into conflict with one another.
primary role of institutions is to establish restrictions on personal benefits.
Institutions set boundaries for individual and group power accumulation.
However, weak institutions provide a vacuum that allows politicians and
bureaucrats to accumulate power. It restricts economic growth simplifying the
process of money-making with minimal effort. (1)
(2) discusses the importance of institutions as follows: "The development
of institutions appears to create a suitable environment that adapts
cooperation to one that resolves problems in a manner that accelerates economic
growth". In contrast, greed, deception, short-term gain thinking slows
economic growth and increases the chance of financial crisis significantly.
North (3), a Nobel prize winner on economics, makes clear that institutions
require three central pillars. First, formal laws as they represent the code to
peaceful coexistence. He argues that in a democratic system, there is room to
design and implement legal codes. Second, informal laws - norms of behaviour
that support peaceful coexistence between individuals. These norms could have
been passed down from past generations, arise from the culture of a social
group, or created, changed and maintained from the practice of coexistence
itself. These norms establish themselves in the individual psyche and thus
allow them to survive and evolve. Therefore, with respect to behaviour, they
influence personal choices and motives.
formal laws are still imperative, the third element is also essential. The
third element, which is often the government, implements the law. The policies
and regulations of the government can become subject to the influence of
informal laws (norms and customs). Douglass North explains that where a
government has the characteristics of a mafia, it can always prevent
development as a problem of agency arises as a result. For example, where a
representative of the people behaves like a mafia or is controlled by other
mafia groups, development gets prevented or regressed. Therefore, Douglass
North argues that the struggle for freedom can not separate from the need for
government to be free from mafia interference. As we will see later, the
establishment of a rentier state has been a part of Iraq since its
this theory paved the way for other theories on economic development to take
forward strides. Adam Smith and other classicist thinkers, like Maltos, argued
that accumulation of wealth is the first step to enrich the nation and allow
for economic development. However, Adam Smith requires free markets and
professionalism, while Maltos reminds us that an increase in population size is
the threat to economic growth and development. Marx believed that capitalism
could create continued economic development.
this regard, Douglas North added value to the body of theories. He argued that
on the one hand, institutions could reduce the hegemony of capital over labour
and, on the other, that free markets were a threat as openness allowed for the
development of non-personal connections. Without the development of agency,
these connections could not be organised and would see exploitation and
subjugation substitute collaboration and cooperation. In turn, going forward,
this leads to a change from open markets to closed ones. Here, the state is the
highest authority and can both promote or inhibit growth. If the state can
establish the right to private ownership, protect individuals, not follow the
individual interests of those behind the levers of government, and can prevent
personal greed from turning into the exploitation of the other, then this is a
strong sign that economic growth can occur. However, a state with weak
institutions can become a space for individuals and groups to attempt to
control the market for their interests. It disrupts professionalism and sees
individuals take on jobs that have no experience or education to support the
role, ultimately leading them to corruption.
a problem can last decades and even centuries. Listed below are the five
reasons as to why I have focussed on the stalling of agency,
The cost of escape and entering relationships;
Collective action and the price of a solution;
first and second points will be discussed thoroughly, but the rest will either
be addressed briefly or will not be discussed as they do not fall into the
scope of this paper.
discussing these points, it is essential to point out some perspectives on the
failure of friendship and unhealthy relationships on the micro and macro
failure of friendships: Faces
novelist, Bakhtiar Ali, described the failure if relationships in his 1998
novel (قەسیدەی عەشقد). He wrote; "Oh beloved, in the time
of predators, make me your prey, as I have come to make you mine."
this poetic image, Bakhtiar Ali depicts the will of lovers to exploit one
another. From marriage through political party relations to inter-governmental
relations, predatory, misleading and fraudulent behaviour has, for decades,
been the main characteristic of relations in Iraq (and probably throughout the
modern world). In this regard, differentiating between the political, social
and business spheres is not essential if one wants only to demonstrate the
failure of relationships on the micro and macro levels in Iraq. This paper will
begin with the breakdown of relationships within Iraqi families.
2017, there were more than 9,000 divorces registered in the Kurdistan Region of
Iraq. This number is notable as it was three times higher than the number of
divorces recorded in 2016. One of the leading causes of divorce was infidelity
and "openness". According to the records, 39 percent of divorces
occurred because spouses could not get along with one another. Nineteen percent
occurred because of economic restraints; 10 percent because of infidelity and
19 percent as a direct result of access to new technologies, which was a
descrives as a cause of temptation and also an enabler for spouses to spy on
one another. (4)
an observation of the Kurdish civil war reveals that there were two key moments
of conflict between the Kurdish political parties towards internal war, one
between the 1970s and the 1980s, and the other between 1992 and 1995. There has
also been a continuous cold war between them, which has grown to include
political parties and political party splinters.
and was has been a constant feature over the decades in relations between Iraqi
Kurdistan and the region. The last chapter of this contempt occurred following
the removal of the former Iraqi dictator, Saddam Hussein, from power. Here, I
wish to layout a part of this narrative.
2005, there was notable economic development in Iraq and its Kurdistan Region.
Whatever the reason for this development, after establishing a legal framework
for the division of income and finances, the governments in both jurisdictions
entered into a prolonged period of friendly relations. The 2005 Iraqi
constitution established that the Kurdistan Regional of Iraq would receive 17
percent of Iraq's total budget, the first time the relationship with Baghdad
advantaged the Iraqi Kurds. However, the elements of centralised planning
continued. Until now, fiscal policy remains in the hands of the Iraqi Federal
Government with minimal involvement of the Kurdistan Regional Government. This
is the same with Iraqi economic policy. Within the Kurdistan Region of Iraq,
the leadership mirrored Baghdad, by centralising financial planning.
few years after the Kurdistan Regional Government passed laws and exported oil
independent of Baghdad, the Iraq Federal Government decided to cut the Kurdish
share of the Iraqi budget, resulting in a new episode of hostility. When, as a
result of this Iraqi decision, the Kurdistan Region succumbed to a financial
crisis, the Iraqi Federal Government did not shoulder any responsibility for
the crisis. Fueling this animosity further was the Kurdistan Regional
Government's resistance to sending its oil revenues to Baghdad to be
redistributed as per the Iraqi constitution. The regional government also
refused nor has the region worked in partnership with Baghdad to create a joint
economic policy (oil, financial, business).
legal amendments, such as the drawing up of the 2005 Iraqi constitution, shows
another facet of this animosity between the two sides. Alexander Dawoody (5)
writes that when the 2005 Iraqi constitution being written, the Iraqi Shia's,
Sunni's and Kurdish leaders contributed to the process based on sectarian and
ethnic lines. Each leader made demands for articles to be included in the constitution
that was self-serving and not serving of a constitution that would allow Iraq
to function as a united state. Put another way, during the process; little
thought was given to inter-ethnic and inter-sectarian cooperation or mutual
beneficial articles, each side wanted to write the constitution in their
respective favours. Ultimately, this led to a weakened Sunni population
boycotting the referendum to adopt the constitution and election of the first
federal Iraqi government in 2005. Since then, significant problems remain
around article 111 and article 112 of the constitution regarding oil sales. As
was set out in the theory, the existence of formal laws is essential; however,
the ability to implement the law is more important. Once again, animosity between
the two sides has replaced cooperation.
9 of the Iraqi constitution banned the formation and existence of militias;
however, neither government could implement this article as they did not have
power over the elites and political parties under there respective authorities.
This demonstrates that a government of agencies and institutions does not exist
in Iraq. The same is true for all issues surrounding Article 140 and the
subject of the Iraqi disputed territories.
stalling of agency and the failure of cooperation: cause
establishment of Iraq in the 1920s was the beginnings of a new social
arrangement between the different social groups in Iraq, in particular the two
largest social groups, the Kurds and the Arabs. From the onset, shortcomings
and failures beset the new Iraqi national project.
another of my papers, titled "The failure of economic reform …" (6) I
discussed that the central reason for the blocking of sustained economic
development in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq is a "non-civil
tradition", rentierism and centralisation. These factors feed off one
another, with one creating or exacerbating the other. Here, I wish to discuss
the causes behind each of these factors.
state of today is, to a great extent, tied to history. The path of history is a
chain of interlinked and compounded events. In Iraq, and the Kurdistan Region
of Iraq this path has seen planned centralisation turn individuals into tools
and not objectives. It has also allowed rentierism to create a political
culture that prevents society from uniting.
economic collapse and retrenchment of the 1940s opened the doors to centralised
government in Iraq. Kamran Matin explains that since the collapse of the
Ottoman Empire, successive empires and regimes that have controlled Iraq have
consistently failed to implement a national program in Iraq. A combination of
factors in each period led to cooperation between the most influential groups
in the country. Among them, the landowners, tribal leaders and political
elites. Hence the people of Iraq have always looked back to regimes gone and
not governments to come.
truth, institutions in their most basic form in Iraq were extensions of their
pre-modern models. In the period of the Iraqi monarchy (1921 - 1958) members of
parliament were seen as tribal, ethnic and sectarian leaders. If they were from
a strong tribe, they would have a robust parliamentary influence. After 1958,
the Iraqi parliament became a one-party institution, and following 2003 the
parliament in Iraq and the Kurdistan Region of Iraq became hostage to the power
of political parties and their leaders.
division of Iraqi society by the Iraqi Ba'ath party began with a simple
division of those that supported the revolution and those that did not. Those
who did not fall in line with the party was considered to be against the
revolution. As a result, they were branded as "traitor" and punished.
The priority of the Iraqi Baath party was to establish an equal society; thus,
it was expected of Iraqi citizens to forgo their ambitions and support behind
the goals of the Ba'ath party leader. The promise was that if they did so, they
would reach the edges of happiness. (8) Through this rhetoric, the Ba'ath party
focused its government on building up its military capabilities. In the first
year of the Iran-Iraq war, military spending in Iraq was at 70 percent of Iraqi
GDP. To receive a mandate over society and acceptance for the political party
to accept its policies, the party leader made use of two other techniques. It
needed to prepare the country for war and war-making.
fall of Iraq's agrarian society, the fall of the Iraqi monarchy and the
expulsion of the Jews from Iraq in the late 1940s, were a chain of events that
saw the Iraq economy transit to a rentier oil-dependent economy. One of the
consequences of this transition was a process of urbanisation in Iraq, which
saw the migration of Iraq's population into the country's cities, transforming
the country's economy. (9) This time the societal groups in Iraq had little
choice but to follow the leaders of the Iraqi Baath party, rather than becoming
independent businessmen. Iraqi Government Policy restricted business, closed
Iraq's borders to individual business activity and limited access to the global
economy, ultimately limited Iraq's capability to develop new business ideas.
The Iraqi Baath party reduced the scope of the business, thereby bringing the
country's economy under the influence of the government and Baath party
institutions. Step by step, the state gained experience in all sectors and
established policies against private ownership. The country's population became
professionals in preserving the system. Kamran Matin explains "the army
took the place of the nation, the political party took the place of the army,
the political party leaders took the place of political parties and ultimately
Saddam Hussein took the place of the entirety of the Iraqi community".
the process of war preparation, war-making, centralisation and
bureaucratisation "the priority was conflict". Isam al-Khafaji
explains, "a mandate was given to the governing elite to centralise
planning and control the division of national income". This contributed to
the creation of a political culture that favoured the county's political elite,
whose power over the population continued to expand. The same pattern reemerged
after the removal of Saddam Hussein.
connecting the past and present was centralisation in a new form. This time it
was a large state under the authority of political parties. Similar to the
1970s, the same chain of events reoccurred in the 1990s. Kurdish leaders were
powerless to stop this pattern from reemerging. Administratively, the same
culture of centralisation; economically, the same dependence on oil; and
politically, the same political model remerged (everything is in the shadow of
the leader and for the leader!). Iraq witnessed the arrival of more than 45 oil
companies from 17 different countries. As I have previously explained, this new
economy changed the motivation of the Kurdish leadership to one focused around
satisfying oil companies rather than the people of Iraq. In truth, the
institutions of state were set up in infatuation with the leader. The institutions
are expected to represent the dreams, visions and wishes of the leader. It is
for this reason when a leader steps down or passes away, these institutions are
left in shock, with some collapsing.
such an environment, political leaders extend their reach to all corners of the
country. It is not a coincidence that some academics in state universities
support one party leader or another. Here, academic institutions and schools
can no longer be considered as centres for human and cultural development. As
evidence for the poor state of the county's public universities, one need only
look to the academics' writing and researching skills. In some university
departments, students write university dissertations in groups of five. Where
they write their research paper in Arabic, they likely do not understand what
they are writing. (10) Political parties and the groups within, require
propaganda machines to maintain their image. Students believe their future
employment prospects are not tied to their education but political affiliation
and connections. Even within these state-funded academic centres
decision-making is done centrally with minimal participation from outside the
centre. I want to stress that the process of education has seen significant
changes in Kurdistan over the last few years with the opening fifteen private
universities. However, this does not change the reality that dozens of
institutions remain under the control of a few individuals who have no
intention to provide opportunities to expand institutional freedoms.
the bigger problem is revealed: humans are beings that are capable of change.
They can change from altruists to egoists; hence the scope for development is
locked. Managing egoists is difficult as a relationship based on mutual trust,
mutual understanding and peaceful resolution can not be established with them.
is one reason why Iraqis cannot resolve their differences, let alone coexist.
From the media to academia, mosques to political parties, this state is perpetuated
in a manner that individuals are prepared to lay down their own lives and the
lives of their opponents for it.
the current economic situation is better than that of the past, communal life
is filled with problems. This has consequently worked to reduce the economic
situation of individuals and leading them into successive sharp and deep
effect of neighbours
previous section was not intended to present an image in which no strides had
been taken towards development. One barrier towards progress is the effect of
neighbours, or "others", as I will call them.
the first quarter of the 20th century, when the power of the United States was
on the rise, it called for the independence of nations. Fearing independence,
the British and French colonial forces in the Middle East divided the region.
They established the state of Iraq, with a portion of Kurdistan attached to
this new country. (11)
a country, Iraq is surrounded by neighbouring states with totalitarian regimes,
allowing for the excuse "the others also do the same thing" when
responding to criticisms regarding their form of government. This is especially
the case in Iraq, Syria, Iran and Turkey.
Syria in 1970, there were thirteen soldiers for every 1000 citizens. This
number increased to 35 soldiers in the 1980s. (12) Khomeini's success, the
increase in Shia influence and the fall of the Pahlavi dynasty at the close of
the 1970s in Iran, in one respects, was caused by the economic strategy of its
neighbours and that of Israel. Israel's military spending exponentially
increased, creating a militarised state under the banner of national security.
Here, each state copied the model of their neighbouring state, regardless of
the religious or cultural backdrop of the given state. Therefore, it was not
easy for Iraq or the Kurdistan Region of Iraq to present a new system in such
an atmosphere. It was difficult for them to establish a political system that
respects humanity, animals or the environment or indeed create a society that
served towards equality and democratisation. Instead, the regional conditions
provided an opportunity for the political elite to push towards
this condition, just as we discussed on the micro-level regarding how husbands
and wives succumb to tribal pressures not to seek legal resolutions that could
lead them to divorce, similar forces are applied to Iraq's Kurds to remain
apart of Iraq. A group of tribal states that neighbour Iraq and its Kurdistan
Region cannot tolerate the idea of a Kurdish separation from Iraq. Within these
states, the rule of law has no sovereignty and does not have a place in
society. For example, when two cars collide the best resolution for those
involves is mediation between the parties involved. When citizens in these
states come into conflict with one another, the law plays a limited role in
resolving their problems. To solve their problems, they return to their tribal
elders to assist in resolution. Resolutions are often reached between the
elders based on family and tribal interests, rather than that right or wrongs.
the same pattern reemerges between organisations. What are the results? It is
difficult for political parties and elites to seek legal resolutions to resolve
problems between themselves. Furthermore, they cannot find legal action against
external players who interfere in internal Kurdish affairs. It is for this
reason that elites and political parties try to preserve themselves through
power accumulation by aligning themselves to one of their respective
neighbouring states. Kamran Matin example assists with this point; he explains
that the Iraqi Shia community aligns with Iran and the Iraqi Sunni community
aligns with Saudi Arabia in order to preserve their positions in Iraq. (13)
as tribal and family members interfere and mediate to prevent couples from
seeking a divorce, to protect the institution of marriage and prevent other
couples from seeking the same solution to their marriage problems; the same is
the case for ethnic separatism as the host state fears for its wider
sovereignty. The separation of the Iraqi Kurds from Iraq risks not only
motivating the Kurds of Iran, Syria and Turkey from seeking the same resolution
but also other ethnicities around the world trying to separate from their hast
states. By taking this state of international politics, the design of the
"Kurdish independence referendum" was a big mistake.
though this issue is outside of the scope of this article, Russia and the
United States played significant roles in the collapse of the Iraqi and Iranian
states. At one stage they assisted at the expense of the other. Their
sanctioning of Iraq handed power to the tribes and elites to maintain hunger
other causes have a direct relationship with the stalling of development; the
first is collective action. As we discussed earlier in this section, it has a
significant impact on collective action. In a society where uncivilised traditions
are dominant, corruption is accepted, and equality is seen as being above the
norm. The system is centralised, individuals are on the periphery, while the
leader is in the centre. Therefore, it is difficult for collective action to
occur. (14) The second is the cost of escape. There may come a specific moment
where the price of flight from a relationship to more costly than coexistence.
(15) On the other hand, peaceful coexistence is not easy when it is compounded
couples are fatigued within relationships.
coexistence, one of the strategies of individuals and powers is for each to
increase its share of the benefits and income they gain from the relationship.
Often through "I have sacrificed more; hence i deserve the lions share in
opportunities and income". (16) Fanar Haddad believes that relations
between the Iraqi Sunni, Shia and Kurdish communities are based around the
principle of victimhood politics. This strategy sees one party attempting to
dominate the other and vice-versa. For this purpose, the most horrendous
tactics are mandated, be them sanctioning the other or entering military
confrontations with them.
of the power expansion by the other sees them mutually restraining each others
independence and ability to exert power. On the micro and macro levels
(couples, political parties, and governments) all sides implement this strategy
as they are guided by the fear of one another, even though the sides are deeply
connected and cannot separate from one another. More important, is maintaining
rations and togetherness and that both parties must have the ability to seek
legal resolution against the other if it impedes on the former's constitutional
rights. In the relationship between Iraq and the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, the
former can seek legal action against the latter; however, the Kurdistan Region
of Iraq cannot do the same against Federal Iraq. This fact works to motivate
the Kurdistan region to act against federal Iraq. In short, just as they can
not peacefully separate, these two parties cannot peacefully coexist
a nation increases its openness, new forms of communication arise—the
transition from personal relationships in trade to non-personal relationships
effects social and political relationships.
the modern history of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, initially, oil brought the
rural and suburban populations to the cities. This migration was followed by
forced migration. During Iraq's third regime, following the collapse of Saddam Hussein's
regime, Iraq and the Kurdistan Region of Iraq opened their borders to the
international community. The institutions failed to update themselves with the
same haste, causing further competition and conflict: between married couples,
between urban and rural communities, between cities, between governments etc.
While the sides in each of these relationships desire separation, they do not
have the opportunity to do so. In the same vein, they are not able to coexist
peacefully or truthfully, support one another, and replace their hatred with a
spirit of togetherness.
individuals, including Kurds, have witnessed war, destruction and totalitarian
organisations extending to education and academia. This experience has limited
individual ability to coexist together peacefully, not to extort one another,
to resolve their problems quickly or indeed to find a path to separation with
the least amount of damage and not to become enemies of one another after.
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Official Data: Divorce Rates Soar in Kurdistanو Friday, 1 March, 2019 - 08:30وhttps://aawsat.com/english/home/article/1613306/official-data-divorce-rates-soar-kurdistan
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