By Dr Niaz Najmadin
Introduction
Throughout
the past century, the Kurdish question has been a forefront issue in Turkish
nationalism, and the only answer the nationalists have presented to resolve the
Kurdish issue is attempting to eliminate the Kurds. Throughout this period,
Turkish nationalism has reared its head in many forms. Still, in each way, the
ethnic cleansing of Turkish minority populations has been at the centre of the
Turkish state's ideology and supported by the country's nationalists.
To
understand the hidden objectives behind Turkey's offensives in the Kurdish
areas of Syria, one must understand both the conflict between these two
nationalisms in Turkey and the ideology of the Turkish state. This Turkish
nationalist ideology has even influenced it's foreign leaving the Kurdistan
Region of Iraq within the crosshairs of the Turkish state too. By utilizing
previous research and exploring the historical issues relating to the matter,
this article will explore the factors that have allowed the Kurds to survive
and not to follow the same path as the Armenians and the Christians of the
Greek Orthodox Church. Furthermore, it will explore how Turkey has transitioned
from a policy of "assimilating the Kurdish population into the Turkish
one" to a system of massacres and ethnic cleansing.
The
first section of the article explores Kurdish nationalism and its difficulties.
The second section explores Turkish nationalism, and in the next four sections,
the report explores the Kurdish question and the arming of Turkish nationalists
in different historical periods. The final section explores current Turkish
foreign policy.
Kurdish nationalism
In
Turkey, the Kurdish question has historically arisen in many different forms.
Theorist, Miroslav Hroch believes some nations have no history, meaning they
have had no collective national memory before their establishment. Neophytos
G.Loizides finds the Kurds fall into this category of nation. Hence, he argues
that the Kurds lack a central feature on their path to statehood. (1) The
governing Turkish Justice and Development Party (AKP) appears to utilize this
lack of Kurdish national memory to oppose Kurdish nationalism by arguing that
citizens of Turkey, be them Turkish, Kurdish or Laz backgrounds have a single
shared national memory. The party argues that under the Ottoman Empire, they
were all Ottoman.
I
will return to this issue later as what is important to note here is that
Kurdish nationalism has not existed for very long, and they don't have a unique
national history. One could describe the Kurdish experience as being in a deep
sleep, and it has not been long since the nation has awoken and understood its
differences to neighbouring states.
The
fall of the Ottoman Empire was the catalyst that allowed different nations and
ethnicities to move in independent directions. With the fall of the empire, the
first utterances of a distinct Kurdish identity started to be heard and opened
the eyes of the Kurdish population. However, the Kurds still lacked an
understanding of shared interest and willingness to engage in a shared national
project. When the Turkish state established, for example, many Kurds believed
themselves to be Turkish and did not see themselves as a being from a different
identity. It was this lack of collective identity that allowed for the Turkish
policy of assimilation to succeed for a period. With the establishment of the
Turkish state, many Kurds joined Ataturk's army.
After
the establishment of Turkey, the state continued its policy of assimilating
different ethnicities, including Kurds, into the Turkish ethnicity. One of the
tools for this project of national assimilation, as discussed by McDoyle, was
education. The Turkish state made the Turkish language the official language
and enforced its sole-use across Turkey's education system. The Kurds
themselves were involved in Turkey's promotion and enforcement of the belief
that the Turks and the Kurds were of the same roots. Some academics went as far
as arguing that there is no such thing as a Kurd; there are just Turks. For
example, at the close of the 1950s, Sharif Furat argued that "the Roots of
the Kurds are the Turks; thus, there is no such thing as a Kurd." Sharif's
work was welcomed by Turkish nationalists as Sharif himself was a Kurd."
During this period, the Kurds were less numerous, illiteracy was widespread,
and transport links between cities were few, restricting communication between
people of different cities and towns. These restrictions prevented any feelings
of identity difference within local populations from arising. A prominent Kurd
of the time, Mahmut Altunaker argued, "I didn't know I was Kurdish until I
reached Kutahya." In Diyarbakir we were conditioned to throw stones at
anybody who would call us Kurds." (2) For Altunker, this was the first
time he was told that he was Kurdish and not Turkish. This lead to feelings of
his ethnic difference to the Turks. Modern Turkey, like other nations, has
witnessed waves or periods of openness to the idea of ethnic diversity. There
were periods where the urban, suburban and rural populations mixed and allowed
the Kurds to become better acquainted with their Kurdish identity.
There
are other reasons why Kurdish nationalism has been weak, such as;
1-
Internal Kurdish conflict and rivalries between Kurdish Alawites and the
Kurdish Sunni populations;
2-
The Kurds did not have a single religion;
3-
The Kurds conflicted with the Armenians, which distracted the community;
4-
Internationally, the Kurds were a relatively unknown population and did not
have a strong position within the foreign policy of the international
superpowers, leading to them having no support international for their
independence.
The
Turks often argued that the Kurds "were drowning in feudalism" and
some of these claims were true. Ismail Beshakchi argued that the feudal
relations in Kurdistan prevented the Kurds from becoming nation builders.
Beshakchi was imprisoned for 13 years for defending the Kurds.
When
Adnan Mandiras, Turkut Ozal, Najmadin Arbakan and Raceb Tayeb Erdogan were busy
building their Islamist parties, a portion of the Kurdish population in Turkey
supported them and placed hope in their parties. However, the Turkish judiciary
outlawed the Kurdish policies of each of these leaders. In other words, these
Islamist parties were elected into government to oppose Kamalism and used the
Kurdish issue to this end. In turn, the Turkish courts placed obstacles before
the AKP party to prevent it from changing the Turkish constitution. Turkey
finds the use of the name "Kurd" unacceptable in all its forms and
used the carrot and stick method to pressure European nations to turn a blind
eye to Turkey's anti-Kurdish operations. (3) In the next section, I will
discuss the marches of Turkish nationalism in different periods.
Turkish
nationalism
The
emergence of Turkish nationalism as a political strategy for national unity,
and not as a cultural movement, can be traced back to the early 20th century
and the fall of Ottomans. In the second quarter of the 20th century, Turkish
nationalism emerged as a secular ideology aimed at underpinning the building of
a modern nation-state.
The
ideology of Turkish nationalism runs deep within the Turkish community be it in
their population or institutions of the state. On the popular level, the
Turkish media apply immense pressure on Turkish officials to the extent that
restricts their ability to discuss the issue of Kurdish ethnic rights.
Governing parties that have been unable to weaken the Kurdistan Workers Party
(PKK) have faced significant media criticism, on occasions to the extent that
this criticism has led to their removal from office. Even when an opportunity
has been given to discussion on Kurdish rights, it has been short-lived.
Between 1991 and 1993, the Peoples Workers Party, which was supported by the
majority of the Kurdish population in Turkey won 18 seats in the Turkish
parliament. Subsequently, one of its MPs was killed, four others were detained,
and six left Turkey. When leaders or academics have argued against this general
Turkish position, they have faced severe repercussions. The Kurds as a general
population have not demanded separation and independence from Turkey, but the
Turkish state's anti-Kurdish ideology continues to view the Kurdish identity as
a threat.
Turkish
nationalism has differed over time. Turkey was founded on extreme and secular
nationalism, however leftist nationalism, an Islamist form of nationalism,
popular nationalism (which was widespread globally in the early 20th century)
are other forms of Turkish nationalism. Turkish nationalism has fallen under
the influence of western reformism and those who favour development. Here, with
the support of Mesut Yegen's research, I will dedicate the next four parts of
this paper to discussing the Kurdish issue in its different stages.
Kurds
as the obstacles to reform
The
reforms of the late Ottoman period did not come in time to save the empire from
collapse. From its establishment, the new Turkish state should have buried the
remnants of the old Ottoman sultans and their regime, to differentiate
themselves from it. One of the central objectives of the Ottoman reform was to
create Ottoman citizens and to promote the idea of decentralization, which
included in the Kurdish areas of Turkey. This Ottoman reform lead to the
reemergence of Turkish nationalists who supported the idea that the only thing
that can unite the people was Turkism.
In
contrast to the Ottomans, the Turks (for example, Committee of Union and
Progress in 1918) promoted the idea of centralization. During the early period,
one of the first accusations levelled against Turkey's Kurdish population was
that they did not accept the concept of centralization. The Turkish
nationalists argued that the Kurds who lived on the Turkish frontiers stood
against the Turks at the centre. During the congress of the Committee of Union
and Progress (CUP) in 1913, the CUP decided to force the nomadic people of
Turkey, including the Kurds, into submission. On the first day of the
declaration of the Young Turks Revolution (YTR), an Ottoman officer in
Diyarbakir, one of the significant Kurdish majority cities in Turkey, spoke to
the Kurds directly and said:
"The
constitution has eliminated the landowners and the tribal heads. From here on,
the landowner and the peasants are equal. You will no longer see landowners,
and you will no longer see tribes. No longer fear the military as you did
before. Service in the military is a religious obligation. Tribal wars are the
work of the devil; military wars are for God. No longer view taxes as bad luck.
The Kurds have only one problem, and that is that they are ignorant.
From
the vantage point of classic Turkish nationalism, the Kurds are loyal to their
tribes; they do not want to serve in the military, they do not want to pay
taxes to the central government, and are generally ignorant. It is for these
reasons that they stand against the centralization of the state. The Turkish
nationalist leaders argued that Kurdish ignorance was an impediment to the
establishment of a modern administration and that their job was to remove this
obstacle to Turkish reform.
A
tactic often used by the Turkish government to establish the idea of
centralization was to attract the Kurds to participate in parliament. The
government was on occasion, successful in this regard and some Kurds did take
seats in the national parliament. To change Kurdish attitudes towards
centralization the CUP allowed some Kurds to establish themselves and take up
senior roles within the party. It was not long after the implementation of
Turkey's constitution when the freedom of the smaller ethnic communities in
Turkey was restricted and outlawed. To establish themselves as Turkey's
superior and official ethnicity, in the era of the CUP the Turks established
dozens of organizations, including National Freedom, National Archives, the
National Cinema, etc.
The
hegemony of one ethnicity was in itself an attempt to erase the smaller
ethnicities in Turkey. From then on, the backing of the CUP by the Kurdish elite
in Istanbul decreased.
Turkish
nationalism and the Kurdish question during the coup
The
First World War had many consequences for Turkey. One was the shrinking of the
Ottoman Empire's power to Anatolia, which later fell under the influence of the
Allied powers. Another consequence was the reduction of non-Muslim peoples in
Turkey. For example, those who survived the Armenian Genocide were sent back to
Armenia and The Greek Orthodox Christians residing in the Ottoman Empire were
traded with Muslims living in Greece. This gap and period of instability fed
Turkish nationalism and allowed in to further cement.
In
1922, after Turkey's war of independence, the nationalist reformists returned
to government. During this period, problems between the Turkish and Kurdish
populations of Turkey increased as there was now perceived to be one religion
but two clear nations in Turkey. This period was also known as the period of
the Turkish coup as the coming to power of the Turkish reformists was viewed as
a coup over the Sultans, Caliphs and other Turkish forces, which they replaced
with a new Turkish republic; a change that was mirrored in law, education and
administration.
In
my opinion, the survival of the Kurds in Turkey was a result of what happened
to the Armenians and Greek Orthodox populations. The Armenians and Greek
Orthodox were sacrificed, and the Kurds were able to survive. If the Turks had
not chosen to target these populations, then the Kurds would have almost
certainly been the target of Turkish ethnic cleansing.
After
the establishment of the Republic of Turkey, the desire of the Turkish
nationalists increased. The 1924 constitution clearly states
"A
nation-state. There is no nation with multiple nationalities. The state will
not accept any other nation but the Turkish nation. There are other people from
other ethnicities and should have equal rights under the constitution; however,
these individuals will not receive separate ethnic rights."
As
can be seen in the above quote, the term "Kurd" has not once been
used. Acceptance of this was difficult for the Kurds as they were promised
constitutional recognition by the Turkish reformists, who promised to treat the
Kurds like Kin. The founder of modern Turkey also made the same promise to the
Kurd, albeit he did this in an Islamic context. After 1924, Turks no longer
recognized the idea of separate ethnic rights for Turkey.
From
here, all the other ethnicities of Turkey were called upon to become Turkish,
and policies of ethnic cleansing and assimilation by Turkish governments
followed. Some extreme nationalists did not accept the idea that other
ethnicities existed in Turkey to be called upon to become Turkish.
For
the Turks, to turn a multiethnic empire into a state with a single ethnic identity,
it was essential to attack the Kurdish population. The head of the Turkish
independence court in 1925, who was responsible for passing execution judgments
on many Kurds, looked to Kurdish leaders and said:
"Some
of you have used people for your ends, and some others have become the levis of
foreign forces. However, all of you agree on one thing – the establishment of a
Kurdish state. The poor people of your regions who were oppressed by sheikhs
and feudal landowners will be rescued from your evil grip, and they will follow
the skilful path of the republic, which has promised development and
comfort."
If
at first the Kurds were accused that they feared centralization because the
Sheikhs and feudal landowners may lose power, then they were later accused of
being old fashioned and could not accept modernization. From the perspective of
the nationalist Turks, the Kurds were a group of thuggish tribes obstructing
modernism. Newspapers of summer 1930 that covered the uprising of the same year
carried headlines reflective of this perspective, for example, one led with,
"The thugs are defeated". On 9 July 1930 the newspaper, Qom
Hurreiyat, had written, "Our aircraft have heavily bombed the
thugs".
The
Kurds as traitors and obstacles to progress
Ottoman
imperialism was replaced with a new form of imperialism. Its collapse presented
the Turks with an opportunity to strengthen their nationalist project through
the message that foreign forces are terrifying and that they will swallow the
Turks. In this context, the Kurds were described as foreign conspirators.
To
the Turkish nationalists, foreigners were at times westerners and at other
times Soviets, especially in the 1960s and 1970s. During this period foreigners
were viewed as being against both the Turkish religion and nation at the same
time. After the establishment of the no-fly-zone over Iraqi Kurdistan in the
1990s, the Turks described the Iraqi Kurds as US conspirators. From the
perspective of the Turks, whether the Kurds were cultured or tribal, they were
always foreign conspirators against the unification of Turkey.
Either
way, Turkish nationalists were able to enforce their political unification
project; however, once this was achieved, Turkey had a problem of a unified
economy. This resulted in further accusations that the Kurds were against the
implementation of a centralized Turkish economy. As can be seen, the Turkish
nationalists found excuses to attack the Kurds at every stage of Turkey's
national development.
Throughout
the 1950s and 1960s, the accusation that the Kurds were against the
establishment of a unified market was the rhetoric of choice of Turkey's
Democratic Party and its Justice party. Without this ideology, it was difficult
for Turkey's Democratic Party to unseat the republicans and for the Justice
party to subsequently unseat the democratic party. The non-unification of the
Turkish economy was that the markets of upper and lower Turkey did not mix. For
the Turks, it was the Kurds that obstructed the unification. In its publications,
the Justice party talked about bringing an end to 'backwardness' and bringing
civilization to Eastern Anatolia, by which the party meant the Kurdish areas of
Turkey. While the dream of the state was seemingly development, it prevented
the development of the Kurds and blamed them for their under-development.
In
short, the Kurds were a useful tool for hiding the disagreements that existed
within the top brass of the Turkish state and their broader dissatisfaction
with the people they governed. Furthermore, the scapegoating of the Kurds also
proved helpful in moving the focus away from the widening inequality between
the haves and the have nots in Turkey.
Globalization
and the rise of the Kurdish question
In
the 1980s the PKK was founded. Its formation came during a period of immense
social and economic change, both nationally and internationally. Here, I must
say, that the political project of Abdullah Ocalan and the PKK against the
Turks and the Turkish state was not without fault. However, one of its stronger
elements was that it did not oppose Turkish nationalism alone, it was also
against tribalism and feudalism, both of which had worked together to weaken
the Kurdish position further.
Economically,
after the failure of the policy to end Turkish dependency on imports, it was
replaced by a policy of favouring imports. This policy increased levels of
inequality across Turkey as homegrown production businesses went out of
business, leaving their people unemployed.
The
Cold War, ended the Soviet Union and the subsequent phenomenon of globalization
caused inequality between nations and increased them within nation-states. The
Gulf War left the Iraqi Kurds protected by an internationally enforced
no-fly-zone as the coverage of the war allowed the story of Kurds to circulate
through global communication networks at a time of increased international
attention to issues of human rights.
The
war between the Kurds and the state increased as regional events left the
Turkish nationalists panicked and in fear of territorial dismemberment. The
extreme nationalists once again called on the Kurds to become Turks. The state
changed its rhetoric from describing the Kurds as "mountain Turks" to
a people that could not be trusted. World events ultimately raised the profile
of the Kurds to the international stage, forcing the Turkish nationalists to
accept their existence. However, the Turks continued to outlaw any ethnic
rights for the Kurds.
The
Kurds in Current Turkish Foreign Policy
If
the establishment of modern Turkey began with a conflict against modern Turkey,
then after a century the Ottoman period has become a fertile ground for sowing
the seeds of national division. The current Turkish government is in some
instances attempting to replicate the Ottoman Empire, and in others trying to
differentiate itself.
In
a research paper, both researchers Cenk Sarac Og˘lu and O¨zhan Demirkol have
discussed the official ideology of the Turkish state and its reflection in the
state's foreign policy and on the Kurdish question. (5)
They
have made clear that under Erdogan's rule, the ideology of the Turkish state
and its foreign policy has entered a new phase. Erdogan wants to become the
representative of the neo-Ottomans, and for this, he requires several things. First,
he needs to enforce his party's ideology over the state. In other words, if the
Turkish state was founded on the thinking and principle of liberalism and
secularism and that its constitution is fixed, then Erdogan wants to change
this ideology and though this change, alter Turkey's foreign policy. However,
Erdogan also wants to stamp Turkish nationalism on the international political
stage in a new form.
The
difference between classic Ottomans and neo-Ottomans is that that the latter
argues that if a new empire is realized it should only represent the Turkish
identity. It should not become an umbrella that brings together other
ethnicities. Instead, they wish to see different ethnicities assimilated into
the Turkish identity. Erdogan utilizes Turkish foreign policy for the
enforcements of his new nationalist project. As the national foreign policy is
reflective of the official national ideology, the AKP should have changed it to
enforce its project internally. The stronger Erdogan's internal national project
is, the further he can drive his neo-Ottoman agenda externally. As Cenk Sarac
Og˘lu and O¨zhan Demirkol have explained, Ahmed Dawood Oglu, Turkey's former
foreign minister, in his book, Strategic Depth, laid out the principles of
Turkish Foreign Policy. These principles were so strong that even Erdogan
returns in everyday discussions and continues to use them.
Nationalism
does not only have shared dreams, memories and interests; it can also become an
ideology. The AKP, like many other political parties, uses nationalism as a
tool to unite the different parts of Turkish society and members within
political parties. With this, politicians and people are tied together.
Nationalism
is an ideology established to create hegemony, and political and societal
forces compete against one another to use nationalism's hegemony. This
competition means each force defines nationalism differently. Based on their
definitions, some of society is excluded from the nation, while others are
included. The AKP, like other political parties in Turkey, was unable to gain
power without redefining nationalism to match the parties interests.
In
this regard, the first task of the AKP was to weaken Kemalist nationalism and
to create a nationalist narrative around Ottomanism. If nationalism is about
creating a shared history and memory, then the AKP was able to prevent an older
description of Turkish nationalism than that presented by the Kemalists. With
this, the AKP would be able to gather the Turkish nation around the AKP's new
project that was being led by Erdogan. Hence, the shared memory is that their
great grandparents were all Ottoman citizens.
Since
the establishment of modern Turkey, the idea of Turkification has run parallel
to religious identity. As discussed earlier, to have a single nationality, the
Turkish nationalists had to expel the Non-Muslim peoples that resided within
the Turkish borders. To become a unified and complete nation, the Turks should
have held the Muslim peoples of the country close. During the governance of the
AKP, Islam transitioned from being a political tool to becoming a national
identity. Under the AKP's definition of a Turk, a person only had to speak
Turkish and be a Sunni Muslim. The latter was rooted in ancient history and was
used by the AKP to confront westerners and capitalists.
To
increase the wealth of the nation the AKP believed that in needed to use the
strategy of the neo-liberals. Where the Kemalists wanted to erase the Kurdish
identity, the AKP was more receptive. The AKP allowed the opening of Kurdish
language TV stations for the Kurdish populations. However, this permission was
not granted to the Kurds as a separate ethnic people, but as an ethnically
Muslim people, revealing the dual- Turkish identity created by the AKP. It's
okay that you don't speak Turkish because the Turks have another identity,
Islam. Come and be part of this Turkish identity. In this new ideology, the
Kurds were also an Ottoman ethnicity and were Sunni Muslim; thus, they should
have no problem being part of this new AKP and Turkish identity. In the 2011
Turkish elections, Erdogan spoke to the Kurds openly and said "Diyarbakir
… we are brothers … we are originally brothers. Those who pray in Ulus Mosque,
those who pray in Istanbul's Sulaiman Mosque and those who pray in the Haji
Bayram Mosque in Ankara all face the same direction". Do you see it? We
all have the same Kibla. Is there any difference in this regard? No!."
When
Masoud Barzani visited Diyarbakir, Erdogan stressed:
"Rejection,
non-acceptance and assimilation have ended with our government. I can call
Turks' Turks', Kurds 'Kurds' and Laz, my brothers the 'Laz'. We are one nation
with all our differences. The terms' Turk', 'Kurd', 'Laz', and 'Qawqazi' all
belong within the definition of nationalism as they are all one nation.
Furthermore, my brothers, this nation has one flag. One flag, for we do not
want other flags, I love you all because of God and not because you are Turks,
Kurds, Laz or this and that. I love you only because of God, because he is the
creator of you and me."
In
this speech, his nationalism is clear. He puts the "Turks" and
"himself" first in his sentences and then follows this with
"Kurds" and "others".
Regarding
representation and globalism, the AKP has no aspirations of becoming the
representatives of the international Sunni Muslim population. Instead, the AKP
wants to utilize the Sunni Muslim identity within the borders of Turkey to
reference a collective Turkish identity, which is increasingly under threat by
the west. He wants to use the Sunni Muslim and Islamic identity to demonstrate
that the borders of the Middle East are artificial and should return to how they
were before the Western powers carved up the Ottoman Empire. It is based on
this framing of the modern Turkish identity that Erdogan believed it is the
Turkish government's right to interfere militarily in Iraqi and Syrian
affairs.
This
is one of the main differences between the AKP, the Kemalists and even the
Ottomans, who wanted to recreate the "Ummah". In his book, Dawood
Oglu, argued that the people within the territory of the old Ottoman Empire all
have a shared memory. In one of his speeches to the Turkish parliament Dawood
Oglu says:
"All
of these lands and regions have the same memories and history. As the Republic
of Turkey, we have no choice but to preserve the rights of the citizens of
these lands. Like a nation which shares the same history and one historical
message. In this context, and without consideration for ethnicity and sect, we
must hold all those whom we have a shared history with close and erase the
artificial borders that divide us. It is for this reason that we are following a
region-wide policy." Since its establishment, the AKP has worked to widen
the scope of its powers. In this process, Rojava fell into crosshairs of the
AKP's power grab.
Here,
I stress that understanding Turkey's foreign policy, as with other regional nations,
will help us to predict its future political and military moves and understand
their impact on the Kurdistan Region of Iraq's economy. It will also make clear
Turkey's general business plans.
In
the first two decades of the 21st Century, Turkey is similar in some respects
to the Classic Ottomans. Through his backing of the neo-Ottoman ideology,
Erdogan wants to ethnicity cense the Kurds by returning 1-2 million out of 3.6
million Syrian refugees from Turkey to the Kurdish areas of Syria. (6)
In
the process of displacing the Armenians during the late Ottoman period, almost
1 million Armenians were killed in 1915. Some found themselves North Syria's
Deir ez-Zor. In the 1920s
And
1930s the Turkish authorities sent Turks to Turkey's Kurdish regions to register
Kurdish land in their names. Furthermore, in the 1990s the Turkish government
flattened thousands of Kurdish villages in its war against the PKK only to
displace tens of thousands of the Kurdish populations of these villages in
different Turkish regions. (7)
Today,
the same process is being repeated against the Kurds of Syria, and Erdogan has
his eyes on Mosul and Kirkuk. If he maintains the same grip over power in
Turkey going forward, it is possible that he may attempt a land grab in these
regions. If not, he may use the territories to play an ugly game with
money-hungry international leaders like Trump. It is also important to note
that in some areas Erdogan has already placed the majority of the Kurdistan
Region of Iraq under its sphere of influence, for example, by flooding the
Kurdish market with Turkish products, providing services in the region,
monopolizing the region's markets and establishing military bases in the
region.
Conclusion:
At
the centre of Turkey's ideology is to erase the Kurdish ethnicity. Where it has
failed in this regard, New Turkish nationalism has done everything in its power
to cleanse the Kurds ethnically. However, its attempts have only failed as the
Kurdish identity is ascending. Turkey's efforts have only worked to bring the
Kurdish people of the Middle East closer together. This ascension has been
caused by the developmental stage of the Kurdish identity, one that has never
been so numerous, internationally widespread, organized, defence-capable, and
can send their message to the high offices of most nations around the
world.
Sources:
1-
Neophytos G. Loizides, State Ideology and the Kurds in Turkey, Middle Eastern
Studies, Routledge, ISSN: 0026-3206 (Print) 1743-7881, (Online) Journal
homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fmes20
2-
Ibid
3-
Ibid
4-
Mesut Yeg˘en, Turkish nationalism and the Kurdish question, Ethnic and Racial
Studies Vol. 30 No. 1 January 2007 pp. 119-151, 2007, Routledge, Taylor &
Francis,
5-
O¨zhan Demirkol and Cenk Sarac Og˘lu , Nationalism and Foreign Policy Discourse
in Turkey Under the AKP Rule: Geography, History and National Identity,
Routledge, British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, 2015 Vol. 42, No. 3,
301–319, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13530194.2014.947152
6-
Nick Ashdown,
Erdogan Wants to Redraw the Middle East's Ethnic Map, NOVEMBER 8, 2019, 11:09
AM https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/11/08/erdogan-wants-redraw-middle-east-ethnic-map-kurds-arabs-turkey-syria/
7-
Erdoğan's safe zone plan resonates Turkey's history of forced migration –
analysis, Nov. 9, 2019, https://ahvalnews.com/recep-tayyip-erdogan/erdogans-safe-zone-plan-resonates-turkeys-history-forced-migration-analysis