By Dr Niaz Najmadin

Introduction
Throughout the past century, the Kurdish question has been a forefront issue in Turkish nationalism, and the only answer the nationalists have presented to resolve the Kurdish issue is attempting to eliminate the Kurds. Throughout this period, Turkish nationalism has reared its head in many forms. Still, in each way, the ethnic cleansing of Turkish minority populations has been at the centre of the Turkish state's ideology and supported by the country's nationalists. 
To understand the hidden objectives behind Turkey's offensives in the Kurdish areas of Syria, one must understand both the conflict between these two nationalisms in Turkey and the ideology of the Turkish state. This Turkish nationalist ideology has even influenced it's foreign leaving the Kurdistan Region of Iraq within the crosshairs of the Turkish state too. By utilizing previous research and exploring the historical issues relating to the matter, this article will explore the factors that have allowed the Kurds to survive and not to follow the same path as the Armenians and the Christians of the Greek Orthodox Church. Furthermore, it will explore how Turkey has transitioned from a policy of "assimilating the Kurdish population into the Turkish one" to a system of massacres and ethnic cleansing. 

The first section of the article explores Kurdish nationalism and its difficulties. The second section explores Turkish nationalism, and in the next four sections, the report explores the Kurdish question and the arming of Turkish nationalists in different historical periods. The final section explores current Turkish foreign policy. 

Kurdish nationalism 
In Turkey, the Kurdish question has historically arisen in many different forms. Theorist, Miroslav Hroch believes some nations have no history, meaning they have had no collective national memory before their establishment. Neophytos G.Loizides finds the Kurds fall into this category of nation. Hence, he argues that the Kurds lack a central feature on their path to statehood. (1) The governing Turkish Justice and Development Party (AKP) appears to utilize this lack of Kurdish national memory to oppose Kurdish nationalism by arguing that citizens of Turkey, be them Turkish, Kurdish or Laz backgrounds have a single shared national memory. The party argues that under the Ottoman Empire, they were all Ottoman. 

I will return to this issue later as what is important to note here is that Kurdish nationalism has not existed for very long, and they don't have a unique national history. One could describe the Kurdish experience as being in a deep sleep, and it has not been long since the nation has awoken and understood its differences to neighbouring states. 

The fall of the Ottoman Empire was the catalyst that allowed different nations and ethnicities to move in independent directions. With the fall of the empire, the first utterances of a distinct Kurdish identity started to be heard and opened the eyes of the Kurdish population. However, the Kurds still lacked an understanding of shared interest and willingness to engage in a shared national project. When the Turkish state established, for example, many Kurds believed themselves to be Turkish and did not see themselves as a being from a different identity. It was this lack of collective identity that allowed for the Turkish policy of assimilation to succeed for a period. With the establishment of the Turkish state, many Kurds joined Ataturk's army. 

After the establishment of Turkey, the state continued its policy of assimilating different ethnicities, including Kurds, into the Turkish ethnicity. One of the tools for this project of national assimilation, as discussed by McDoyle, was education. The Turkish state made the Turkish language the official language and enforced its sole-use across Turkey's education system. The Kurds themselves were involved in Turkey's promotion and enforcement of the belief that the Turks and the Kurds were of the same roots. Some academics went as far as arguing that there is no such thing as a Kurd; there are just Turks. For example, at the close of the 1950s, Sharif Furat argued that "the Roots of the Kurds are the Turks; thus, there is no such thing as a Kurd." Sharif's work was welcomed by Turkish nationalists as Sharif himself was a Kurd." During this period, the Kurds were less numerous, illiteracy was widespread, and transport links between cities were few, restricting communication between people of different cities and towns. These restrictions prevented any feelings of identity difference within local populations from arising. A prominent Kurd of the time, Mahmut Altunaker argued, "I didn't know I was Kurdish until I reached Kutahya." In Diyarbakir we were conditioned to throw stones at anybody who would call us Kurds." (2) For Altunker, this was the first time he was told that he was Kurdish and not Turkish. This lead to feelings of his ethnic difference to the Turks. Modern Turkey, like other nations, has witnessed waves or periods of openness to the idea of ethnic diversity. There were periods where the urban, suburban and rural populations mixed and allowed the Kurds to become better acquainted with their Kurdish identity. 

There are other reasons why Kurdish nationalism has been weak, such as;

1- Internal Kurdish conflict and rivalries between Kurdish Alawites and the Kurdish Sunni populations;
2- The Kurds did not have a single religion;
3- The Kurds conflicted with the Armenians, which distracted the community; 
4- Internationally, the Kurds were a relatively unknown population and did not have a strong position within the foreign policy of the international superpowers, leading to them having no support international for their independence. 

The Turks often argued that the Kurds "were drowning in feudalism" and some of these claims were true. Ismail Beshakchi argued that the feudal relations in Kurdistan prevented the Kurds from becoming nation builders. Beshakchi was imprisoned for 13 years for defending the Kurds. 

When Adnan Mandiras, Turkut Ozal, Najmadin Arbakan and Raceb Tayeb Erdogan were busy building their Islamist parties, a portion of the Kurdish population in Turkey supported them and placed hope in their parties. However, the Turkish judiciary outlawed the Kurdish policies of each of these leaders. In other words, these Islamist parties were elected into government to oppose Kamalism and used the Kurdish issue to this end. In turn, the Turkish courts placed obstacles before the AKP party to prevent it from changing the Turkish constitution. Turkey finds the use of the name "Kurd" unacceptable in all its forms and used the carrot and stick method to pressure European nations to turn a blind eye to Turkey's anti-Kurdish operations. (3) In the next section, I will discuss the marches of Turkish nationalism in different periods. 

Turkish nationalism
The emergence of Turkish nationalism as a political strategy for national unity, and not as a cultural movement, can be traced back to the early 20th century and the fall of Ottomans. In the second quarter of the 20th century, Turkish nationalism emerged as a secular ideology aimed at underpinning the building of a modern nation-state.  

The ideology of Turkish nationalism runs deep within the Turkish community be it in their population or institutions of the state. On the popular level, the Turkish media apply immense pressure on Turkish officials to the extent that restricts their ability to discuss the issue of Kurdish ethnic rights. Governing parties that have been unable to weaken the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) have faced significant media criticism, on occasions to the extent that this criticism has led to their removal from office. Even when an opportunity has been given to discussion on Kurdish rights, it has been short-lived. Between 1991 and 1993, the Peoples Workers Party, which was supported by the majority of the Kurdish population in Turkey won 18 seats in the Turkish parliament. Subsequently, one of its MPs was killed, four others were detained, and six left Turkey. When leaders or academics have argued against this general Turkish position, they have faced severe repercussions. The Kurds as a general population have not demanded separation and independence from Turkey, but the Turkish state's anti-Kurdish ideology continues to view the Kurdish identity as a threat. 

Turkish nationalism has differed over time. Turkey was founded on extreme and secular nationalism, however leftist nationalism, an Islamist form of nationalism, popular nationalism (which was widespread globally in the early 20th century) are other forms of Turkish nationalism. Turkish nationalism has fallen under the influence of western reformism and those who favour development. Here, with the support of Mesut Yegen's research, I will dedicate the next four parts of this paper to discussing the Kurdish issue in its different stages. 

Kurds as the obstacles to reform
The reforms of the late Ottoman period did not come in time to save the empire from collapse. From its establishment, the new Turkish state should have buried the remnants of the old Ottoman sultans and their regime, to differentiate themselves from it. One of the central objectives of the Ottoman reform was to create Ottoman citizens and to promote the idea of decentralization, which included in the Kurdish areas of Turkey. This Ottoman reform lead to the reemergence of Turkish nationalists who supported the idea that the only thing that can unite the people was Turkism. 
In contrast to the Ottomans, the Turks (for example, Committee of Union and Progress in 1918) promoted the idea of centralization. During the early period, one of the first accusations levelled against Turkey's Kurdish population was that they did not accept the concept of centralization. The Turkish nationalists argued that the Kurds who lived on the Turkish frontiers stood against the Turks at the centre. During the congress of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) in 1913, the CUP decided to force the nomadic people of Turkey, including the Kurds, into submission. On the first day of the declaration of the Young Turks Revolution (YTR), an Ottoman officer in Diyarbakir, one of the significant Kurdish majority cities in Turkey, spoke to the Kurds directly and said:
"The constitution has eliminated the landowners and the tribal heads. From here on, the landowner and the peasants are equal. You will no longer see landowners, and you will no longer see tribes. No longer fear the military as you did before. Service in the military is a religious obligation. Tribal wars are the work of the devil; military wars are for God. No longer view taxes as bad luck. The Kurds have only one problem, and that is that they are ignorant.
From the vantage point of classic Turkish nationalism, the Kurds are loyal to their tribes; they do not want to serve in the military, they do not want to pay taxes to the central government, and are generally ignorant. It is for these reasons that they stand against the centralization of the state. The Turkish nationalist leaders argued that Kurdish ignorance was an impediment to the establishment of a modern administration and that their job was to remove this obstacle to Turkish reform. 
A tactic often used by the Turkish government to establish the idea of centralization was to attract the Kurds to participate in parliament. The government was on occasion, successful in this regard and some Kurds did take seats in the national parliament. To change Kurdish attitudes towards centralization the CUP allowed some Kurds to establish themselves and take up senior roles within the party. It was not long after the implementation of Turkey's constitution when the freedom of the smaller ethnic communities in Turkey was restricted and outlawed. To establish themselves as Turkey's superior and official ethnicity, in the era of the CUP the Turks established dozens of organizations, including National Freedom, National Archives, the National Cinema, etc. 
The hegemony of one ethnicity was in itself an attempt to erase the smaller ethnicities in Turkey. From then on, the backing of the CUP by the Kurdish elite in Istanbul decreased. 

Turkish nationalism and the Kurdish question during the coup
The First World War had many consequences for Turkey. One was the shrinking of the Ottoman Empire's power to Anatolia, which later fell under the influence of the Allied powers. Another consequence was the reduction of non-Muslim peoples in Turkey. For example, those who survived the Armenian Genocide were sent back to Armenia and The Greek Orthodox Christians residing in the Ottoman Empire were traded with Muslims living in Greece. This gap and period of instability fed Turkish nationalism and allowed in to further cement. 
In 1922, after Turkey's war of independence, the nationalist reformists returned to government. During this period, problems between the Turkish and Kurdish populations of Turkey increased as there was now perceived to be one religion but two clear nations in Turkey. This period was also known as the period of the Turkish coup as the coming to power of the Turkish reformists was viewed as a coup over the Sultans, Caliphs and other Turkish forces, which they replaced with a new Turkish republic; a change that was mirrored in law, education and administration. 
In my opinion, the survival of the Kurds in Turkey was a result of what happened to the Armenians and Greek Orthodox populations. The Armenians and Greek Orthodox were sacrificed, and the Kurds were able to survive. If the Turks had not chosen to target these populations, then the Kurds would have almost certainly been the target of Turkish ethnic cleansing. 
After the establishment of the Republic of Turkey, the desire of the Turkish nationalists increased. The 1924 constitution clearly states
"A nation-state. There is no nation with multiple nationalities. The state will not accept any other nation but the Turkish nation. There are other people from other ethnicities and should have equal rights under the constitution; however, these individuals will not receive separate ethnic rights." 
As can be seen in the above quote, the term "Kurd" has not once been used. Acceptance of this was difficult for the Kurds as they were promised constitutional recognition by the Turkish reformists, who promised to treat the Kurds like Kin. The founder of modern Turkey also made the same promise to the Kurd, albeit he did this in an Islamic context. After 1924, Turks no longer recognized the idea of separate ethnic rights for Turkey. 
From here, all the other ethnicities of Turkey were called upon to become Turkish, and policies of ethnic cleansing and assimilation by Turkish governments followed. Some extreme nationalists did not accept the idea that other ethnicities existed in Turkey to be called upon to become Turkish.  
For the Turks, to turn a multiethnic empire into a state with a single ethnic identity, it was essential to attack the Kurdish population. The head of the Turkish independence court in 1925, who was responsible for passing execution judgments on many Kurds, looked to Kurdish leaders and said:
"Some of you have used people for your ends, and some others have become the levis of foreign forces. However, all of you agree on one thing – the establishment of a Kurdish state. The poor people of your regions who were oppressed by sheikhs and feudal landowners will be rescued from your evil grip, and they will follow the skilful path of the republic, which has promised development and comfort." 
If at first the Kurds were accused that they feared centralization because the Sheikhs and feudal landowners may lose power, then they were later accused of being old fashioned and could not accept modernization. From the perspective of the nationalist Turks, the Kurds were a group of thuggish tribes obstructing modernism. Newspapers of summer 1930 that covered the uprising of the same year carried headlines reflective of this perspective, for example, one led with, "The thugs are defeated". On 9 July 1930 the newspaper, Qom Hurreiyat, had written, "Our aircraft have heavily bombed the thugs". 

The Kurds as traitors and obstacles to progress
Ottoman imperialism was replaced with a new form of imperialism. Its collapse presented the Turks with an opportunity to strengthen their nationalist project through the message that foreign forces are terrifying and that they will swallow the Turks. In this context, the Kurds were described as foreign conspirators. 
To the Turkish nationalists, foreigners were at times westerners and at other times Soviets, especially in the 1960s and 1970s. During this period foreigners were viewed as being against both the Turkish religion and nation at the same time. After the establishment of the no-fly-zone over Iraqi Kurdistan in the 1990s, the Turks described the Iraqi Kurds as US conspirators. From the perspective of the Turks, whether the Kurds were cultured or tribal, they were always foreign conspirators against the unification of Turkey. 
Either way, Turkish nationalists were able to enforce their political unification project; however, once this was achieved, Turkey had a problem of a unified economy. This resulted in further accusations that the Kurds were against the implementation of a centralized Turkish economy. As can be seen, the Turkish nationalists found excuses to attack the Kurds at every stage of Turkey's national development. 
Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, the accusation that the Kurds were against the establishment of a unified market was the rhetoric of choice of Turkey's Democratic Party and its Justice party. Without this ideology, it was difficult for Turkey's Democratic Party to unseat the republicans and for the Justice party to subsequently unseat the democratic party. The non-unification of the Turkish economy was that the markets of upper and lower Turkey did not mix. For the Turks, it was the Kurds that obstructed the unification. In its publications, the Justice party talked about bringing an end to 'backwardness' and bringing civilization to Eastern Anatolia, by which the party meant the Kurdish areas of Turkey. While the dream of the state was seemingly development, it prevented the development of the Kurds and blamed them for their under-development.    
In short, the Kurds were a useful tool for hiding the disagreements that existed within the top brass of the Turkish state and their broader dissatisfaction with the people they governed. Furthermore, the scapegoating of the Kurds also proved helpful in moving the focus away from the widening inequality between the haves and the have nots in Turkey. 

Globalization and the rise of the Kurdish question

In the 1980s the PKK was founded. Its formation came during a period of immense social and economic change, both nationally and internationally. Here, I must say, that the political project of Abdullah Ocalan and the PKK against the Turks and the Turkish state was not without fault. However, one of its stronger elements was that it did not oppose Turkish nationalism alone, it was also against tribalism and feudalism, both of which had worked together to weaken the Kurdish position further.  
Economically, after the failure of the policy to end Turkish dependency on imports, it was replaced by a policy of favouring imports. This policy increased levels of inequality across Turkey as homegrown production businesses went out of business, leaving their people unemployed.
The Cold War, ended the Soviet Union and the subsequent phenomenon of globalization caused inequality between nations and increased them within nation-states. The Gulf War left the Iraqi Kurds protected by an internationally enforced no-fly-zone as the coverage of the war allowed the story of Kurds to circulate through global communication networks at a time of increased international attention to issues of human rights. 
The war between the Kurds and the state increased as regional events left the Turkish nationalists panicked and in fear of territorial dismemberment. The extreme nationalists once again called on the Kurds to become Turks. The state changed its rhetoric from describing the Kurds as "mountain Turks" to a people that could not be trusted. World events ultimately raised the profile of the Kurds to the international stage, forcing the Turkish nationalists to accept their existence. However, the Turks continued to outlaw any ethnic rights for the Kurds.  

The Kurds in Current Turkish Foreign Policy
If the establishment of modern Turkey began with a conflict against modern Turkey, then after a century the Ottoman period has become a fertile ground for sowing the seeds of national division. The current Turkish government is in some instances attempting to replicate the Ottoman Empire, and in others trying to differentiate itself. 

In a research paper, both researchers Cenk Sarac Og˘lu and O¨zhan Demirkol have discussed the official ideology of the Turkish state and its reflection in the state's foreign policy and on the Kurdish question. (5)

They have made clear that under Erdogan's rule, the ideology of the Turkish state and its foreign policy has entered a new phase. Erdogan wants to become the representative of the neo-Ottomans, and for this, he requires several things. First, he needs to enforce his party's ideology over the state. In other words, if the Turkish state was founded on the thinking and principle of liberalism and secularism and that its constitution is fixed, then Erdogan wants to change this ideology and though this change, alter Turkey's foreign policy. However, Erdogan also wants to stamp Turkish nationalism on the international political stage in a new form. 

The difference between classic Ottomans and neo-Ottomans is that that the latter argues that if a new empire is realized it should only represent the Turkish identity. It should not become an umbrella that brings together other ethnicities. Instead, they wish to see different ethnicities assimilated into the Turkish identity. Erdogan utilizes Turkish foreign policy for the enforcements of his new nationalist project. As the national foreign policy is reflective of the official national ideology, the AKP should have changed it to enforce its project internally. The stronger Erdogan's internal national project is, the further he can drive his neo-Ottoman agenda externally. As Cenk Sarac Og˘lu and O¨zhan Demirkol have explained, Ahmed Dawood Oglu, Turkey's former foreign minister, in his book, Strategic Depth, laid out the principles of Turkish Foreign Policy. These principles were so strong that even Erdogan returns in everyday discussions and continues to use them. 

Nationalism does not only have shared dreams, memories and interests; it can also become an ideology. The AKP, like many other political parties, uses nationalism as a tool to unite the different parts of Turkish society and members within political parties. With this, politicians and people are tied together. 

Nationalism is an ideology established to create hegemony, and political and societal forces compete against one another to use nationalism's hegemony. This competition means each force defines nationalism differently. Based on their definitions, some of society is excluded from the nation, while others are included. The AKP, like other political parties in Turkey, was unable to gain power without redefining nationalism to match the parties interests. 

In this regard, the first task of the AKP was to weaken Kemalist nationalism and to create a nationalist narrative around Ottomanism. If nationalism is about creating a shared history and memory, then the AKP was able to prevent an older description of Turkish nationalism than that presented by the Kemalists. With this, the AKP would be able to gather the Turkish nation around the AKP's new project that was being led by Erdogan. Hence, the shared memory is that their great grandparents were all Ottoman citizens. 

Since the establishment of modern Turkey, the idea of Turkification has run parallel to religious identity. As discussed earlier, to have a single nationality, the Turkish nationalists had to expel the Non-Muslim peoples that resided within the Turkish borders. To become a unified and complete nation, the Turks should have held the Muslim peoples of the country close. During the governance of the AKP, Islam transitioned from being a political tool to becoming a national identity. Under the AKP's definition of a Turk, a person only had to speak Turkish and be a Sunni Muslim. The latter was rooted in ancient history and was used by the AKP to confront westerners and capitalists. 

To increase the wealth of the nation the AKP believed that in needed to use the strategy of the neo-liberals. Where the Kemalists wanted to erase the Kurdish identity, the AKP was more receptive. The AKP allowed the opening of Kurdish language TV stations for the Kurdish populations. However, this permission was not granted to the Kurds as a separate ethnic people, but as an ethnically Muslim people, revealing the dual- Turkish identity created by the AKP. It's okay that you don't speak Turkish because the Turks have another identity, Islam. Come and be part of this Turkish identity. In this new ideology, the Kurds were also an Ottoman ethnicity and were Sunni Muslim; thus, they should have no problem being part of this new AKP and Turkish identity. In the 2011 Turkish elections, Erdogan spoke to the Kurds openly and said "Diyarbakir … we are brothers … we are originally brothers. Those who pray in Ulus Mosque, those who pray in Istanbul's Sulaiman Mosque and those who pray in the Haji Bayram Mosque in Ankara all face the same direction". Do you see it? We all have the same Kibla. Is there any difference in this regard? No!."   

When Masoud Barzani visited Diyarbakir, Erdogan stressed:
"Rejection, non-acceptance and assimilation have ended with our government. I can call Turks' Turks', Kurds 'Kurds' and Laz, my brothers the 'Laz'. We are one nation with all our differences. The terms' Turk', 'Kurd', 'Laz', and 'Qawqazi' all belong within the definition of nationalism as they are all one nation. Furthermore, my brothers, this nation has one flag. One flag, for we do not want other flags, I love you all because of God and not because you are Turks, Kurds, Laz or this and that. I love you only because of God, because he is the creator of you and me." 
In this speech, his nationalism is clear. He puts the "Turks" and "himself" first in his sentences and then follows this with "Kurds" and "others". 
Regarding representation and globalism, the AKP has no aspirations of becoming the representatives of the international Sunni Muslim population. Instead, the AKP wants to utilize the Sunni Muslim identity within the borders of Turkey to reference a collective Turkish identity, which is increasingly under threat by the west. He wants to use the Sunni Muslim and Islamic identity to demonstrate that the borders of the Middle East are artificial and should return to how they were before the Western powers carved up the Ottoman Empire. It is based on this framing of the modern Turkish identity that Erdogan believed it is the Turkish government's right to interfere militarily in Iraqi and Syrian affairs.  

This is one of the main differences between the AKP, the Kemalists and even the Ottomans, who wanted to recreate the "Ummah". In his book, Dawood Oglu, argued that the people within the territory of the old Ottoman Empire all have a shared memory. In one of his speeches to the Turkish parliament Dawood Oglu says: 

"All of these lands and regions have the same memories and history. As the Republic of Turkey, we have no choice but to preserve the rights of the citizens of these lands. Like a nation which shares the same history and one historical message. In this context, and without consideration for ethnicity and sect, we must hold all those whom we have a shared history with close and erase the artificial borders that divide us. It is for this reason that we are following a region-wide policy." Since its establishment, the AKP has worked to widen the scope of its powers. In this process, Rojava fell into crosshairs of the AKP's power grab. 

Here, I stress that understanding Turkey's foreign policy, as with other regional nations, will help us to predict its future political and military moves and understand their impact on the Kurdistan Region of Iraq's economy. It will also make clear Turkey's general business plans. 

In the first two decades of the 21st Century, Turkey is similar in some respects to the Classic Ottomans. Through his backing of the neo-Ottoman ideology, Erdogan wants to ethnicity cense the Kurds by returning 1-2 million out of 3.6 million Syrian refugees from Turkey to the Kurdish areas of Syria. (6)

In the process of displacing the Armenians during the late Ottoman period, almost 1 million Armenians were killed in 1915. Some found themselves North Syria's Deir ez-Zor. In the 1920s
And 1930s the Turkish authorities sent Turks to Turkey's Kurdish regions to register Kurdish land in their names. Furthermore, in the 1990s the Turkish government flattened thousands of Kurdish villages in its war against the PKK only to displace tens of thousands of the Kurdish populations of these villages in different Turkish regions. (7)

Today, the same process is being repeated against the Kurds of Syria, and Erdogan has his eyes on Mosul and Kirkuk. If he maintains the same grip over power in Turkey going forward, it is possible that he may attempt a land grab in these regions. If not, he may use the territories to play an ugly game with money-hungry international leaders like Trump. It is also important to note that in some areas Erdogan has already placed the majority of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq under its sphere of influence, for example, by flooding the Kurdish market with Turkish products, providing services in the region, monopolizing the region's markets and establishing military bases in the region. 

Conclusion: 

At the centre of Turkey's ideology is to erase the Kurdish ethnicity. Where it has failed in this regard, New Turkish nationalism has done everything in its power to cleanse the Kurds ethnically. However, its attempts have only failed as the Kurdish identity is ascending. Turkey's efforts have only worked to bring the Kurdish people of the Middle East closer together. This ascension has been caused by the developmental stage of the Kurdish identity, one that has never been so numerous, internationally widespread, organized, defence-capable, and can send their message to the high offices of most nations around the world. 

Sources: 

1- Neophytos G. Loizides, State Ideology and the Kurds in Turkey, Middle Eastern Studies, Routledge, ISSN: 0026-3206 (Print) 1743-7881, (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fmes20
2- Ibid
3- Ibid
4- Mesut Yeg˘en, Turkish nationalism and the Kurdish question, Ethnic and Racial Studies Vol. 30 No. 1 January 2007 pp. 119-151, 2007, Routledge, Taylor & Francis,
5- O¨zhan Demirkol and Cenk Sarac Og˘lu , Nationalism and Foreign Policy Discourse in Turkey Under the AKP Rule: Geography, History and National Identity, Routledge, British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, 2015 Vol. 42, No. 3, 301–319, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13530194.2014.947152
6-   Nick Ashdown, Erdogan Wants to Redraw the Middle East's Ethnic Map, NOVEMBER 8, 2019, 11:09 AM https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/11/08/erdogan-wants-redraw-middle-east-ethnic-map-kurds-arabs-turkey-syria/
7- Erdoğan's safe zone plan resonates Turkey's history of forced migration – analysis, Nov. 9, 2019, https://ahvalnews.com/recep-tayyip-erdogan/erdogans-safe-zone-plan-resonates-turkeys-history-forced-migration-analysis