6 years ago
Farhad H. Abdullah
Despite the opposition of the
central government in Baghdad, Kurdish political parties agreed to hold a
referendum in the region on September 25th, 2017. The Kurdistan Regional
Government (KRG) said that the referendum includes disputed areas, such as oil-rich
province of Kirkuk, which is claimed by the Kurds and Baghdad.Unquestionably, there will be some serious
security and military threats that the KRG will not able to handle on their
own. This piece details the security threats (in classical term military
threats). So, the question in everybody’s mind these days is what will be the
military threats to Iraqi Kurdistan if the region announces its independence?
MPF and Independent Kurdistan
Iran is pursuing a policy of strengthening its influence and
interests in other countries, relying on non-governmental actors after the
success of the Hezbollah support experiment, which is now in control of the
Lebanese decisions. This type of dependence on governmental and
non-governmental organizations are prevalent in Yemen, Iraq, and Syria, where
Iran officially supports groups such as Ansar Allah led by Abdul Malik
al-Houthi, which seized control of the Yemeni capital of Sana’a in late
September 2014, and dozens of Iraqi militias active in both Syria and Iraq, such
as Asaib Ah Al-Badr, Saraya al-Kharasani, and other Shiite groups operating
under the cover of the People's Mobilization Forces (MPF). Most of the Shiite
militias and factions were formed by local volunteers under the PMF. Even
though the Iraqi Parliament acknowledged PMF as a legal force, Abadi is
too weak to take on the militias directly.
The MPF objective encompasses eliminating terrorism in Iraq
and in the region, to protecting the regime and the political process in Iraq,
as per Abu Mahdi al-Mohandes, who is the deputy chairman of MPF Committee. Shia
militants are concerned with protecting the regime and the political process,
which is an uncharted territory for the PMF. It is an explicit declaration of
the possibility of turning it into a sensitive and dangerous situation. The PMF
are a great danger, but their threat is limited to certain (disputed) areas.
These militants have fought to turn Iraq into a Shiite state that answer to the
mullahs in Tehran. The next battle for Iraqi Shiite forces is to guarantee the
territorial integrity of Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon, so that Iran (and its
allies) can move unhindered throughout these regions. The partition of Iraq is
the redline for Tehran, and in the case of a referendum and declaration of
independence of northern Iraq, the PMF will be mobilized against the KRG. Some
believes that the threat of war by the MPF against KRG arises not from the
referendum, but from the disputed areas will be included in the upcoming
referendum. Nonetheless, several indicators show that PMF will fuel the
sectarian situation already present in Iraqi society, and will increase its
division, which will inevitably lead to a new civil war and security threats
aimed at the Kurdish entity. The war already took place in the disputed areas
(Tuz Khurmatu) between Kurdish forces and MPF, after intervention in those
areas by Peshmarga forces.
Arming Minorities in Disputed Areas
The Iraqi parliament voted earlier in favor of the PMF as an
official formation and part of the Iraqi armed forces, authorizing them to
enter any part of the country to liberate them from terrorist gangs, maintain
security in other areas, and defend it against any potential threat. This
grants them the flexibility to move into areas that are under the control of
the Iraqi army prior to the arrival of ISIS, particularly the disputed areas
between the Baghdad and Erbil. It is expected that the MPF would encircle the
borders of the Kurdish Region via the exploitation and arming of minorities,
particularly Shia Turkmen, who have sought PMF patronage to increase their
local autonomy. It is very vital that the road be closed for the plan to work.
Tensions between the Shiite popular crowd and the Kurdish
peshmerga already reached unprecedented levels. Clashes erupted in Tuz Kurmatu
after the attack on the headquarters of the Peshmerga forces in town, resulting
in casualties on both sides. Some factions of the PMF are also arming the
tribes of Tuz Khurmato following recent security developments, which began to
widen through the mutual targeting of the Peshmerga and civilians. The PMF in
the Tuz will not stay long, but arming the tribes will prevent the Peshmerga
from coming back to Tuz to create tensions.
Tensions between Shiite militias and Kurds is not only
prevalent in Tuz Khirramato district south of Kirkuk, but the crowd is also
taking advantage of the battle of Mosul and use it as a cover to approach the
borders of the Kurdistan region, as per their earlier threats. Recently, there
was a warning that an armed conflict might erupt between both sides over
disagreements on the security of the Sinjar area in Nineveh province. The
crowd entering Sinjar, west of Mosul, could very well lead to a war. The leader
of the PMF, Jawad Talibawi, already launched an attack on the Peshmerga, and
explained that removing them from Nineveh will be easier than expelling ISIS.
He also called for the need to subject the entire territory of Iraq to the
control of the state, threatening to use force against the Peshmerga in the
event of "non-compliance" to the orders of Abadi. Recently, dozens of
Yazidis Peshmerga, including military officials who left their ranks and joined
the PMF, said that they expect the MPF to help the Yezidis return to their
areas and provide the necessary assistance because they are Iraqi forces, and
we must respect them as we respect any other fighting force.
Recruiting Kurdish Citizen
The economic situation that the region is going through due
to its reduced budget from the central government in Baghdad and the drop in
oil prices resulted in increased unemployment; which provided a good
environment for PMF to attract the people of the region to join its ranks and
promote its agenda, which differs from the one espoused by Baghdad. Those who
register will receive 1,100,000 Iraqi dinars per month, and if they have
families, they will earn 250,000 dinars more, and if killed, will be considered
martyrs, and their families will be granted 15 million Iraqi dinars and a piece
of land. Mohammed al-Bayati, the official of the northern section of the PMF,
admitted that "a small number" of the region's citizens and figures
had joined them. Some were told that they could form military regiments.
Al-Bayati also pointed out that "The Kurds who join the popular
mobilization are deployed on the border line of the disputed areas of Kirkuk
and Khanaqin because we need them there". The registration of
volunteers from the Kurdistan region into the ranks of the PMF in the Kurdistan
region is reminiscent of the previous regime, which used volunteers to fight
Kurdish forces.
In addition, the Iraqi government can further threaten the
Kurdish region by preventing the passage of arms, weapons, and ammunition to
the KGR, and especially to those partaking in the international coalition
against ISIS. Even the United States does not prefer to send direct
military assistance to the KRG. The central government may try to sign a
security agreement with neighboring countries (Iran and Turkey) to allow for
the direct intervention in Iraq through their respective military forces, and
the establishment of bases in northern Iraq. Baghdad has been unable to control
the regions bordering both countries. On July 23rd, 2017, Iran and Iraq
signed a military agreement to step up military cooperation, which also includes
border security, logistical, and training support. Despite their disputes, the
Iraqi government will take a parallel step with Turkey to militarily contain
Iraqi Kurdistan.
In terms of difficulties of referendum, the most prominent is
the rejection of the Shiites and Sunnis for independence of the region. The
public opinions of Iraqi Arabs (Shiites and Sunnis) have rejected the partition
of the country; they have not even welcome federalism. The disputed areas are
inhabited by a mixture of Sunnis Arabs, Turkmen, and Kurds. The Arab (even
Turkmen) nationalist could probably form semi-military organizations to fight
Kurdish forces, compelling the Kurds to leave, even abducting and killing them
in areas beyond the control of KRG. For instance; after announcing holding
referendum in September 2017, the citizens of the Failli Kurds are currently
being exposed to various types of threats of killing, displacement,
and looting in some areas.
Externally, the military threats are as serious internally as
it is externally. The neighboring countries will expose military threats to the
Kurdistan region. Iranian and Turkish planes and artillery have constantly
bombed border villages in the Kurdistan region of Iraq, targeting elements and
positions of PJAK and PKK, YPG, and SDF in northern Iraq,
including Sinjar.
The neighboring countries – particularly Iran; might try to
create and bring Jihadist to border regions between Kurdistan and Iran in order
to destabilize the region. Ansar al-Islam fi Kurdistan (Jund al-Islam)
bases were in and around the villages of Biyara and Tawela, which lied
northeast of the town of Halabja in the Hawraman region of Sulaimaniya province
bordering Iran. The PUK claims that dozens of Al-Qaeda fighters joined Ansar
Al-Islam in Iraq after 9/11 attacks, with as many as 57 "Arab Afghan"
fighters entering Kurdistan via Iran. Taken together with credible reports of
the return of some Ansar al-Islam fighters to Iraqi Kurdistan through Iran
suggest that these fighters have received at least limited support from
Iranian sources. It is therefore not surprising that the Iranian government is
repeating their previous endeavor when dealing with the Kurdish state.
Similarly, Turkey might use Turkmen in Kirkuk and other areas to destabilize
the security situation in the Kurdistan region and disputed areas by arming and
mobilizing them.
This article was originally published by Modern Diplomacy